

## Abstracts

**Kerry Bader(Greenwich/USA)**

### **Media, Enlightenment and the Teen Mind**

Due to both psychological and biological factors many adolescents and teens go through a process of rejecting the norms and standards established by their parents and other adults. Proprieties regarding language, sexual behavior and religion are abandoned as teens seek to assert their independence and autonomy. While teens may believe that in casting off the societal norms and expectations of their parents they are journeying towards enlightenment, this is not necessarily the case. Working with a cohort of 16-18 year olds, my empirical analysis suggests that teens merely often substitute the norms of one group (parents and adults) for those of another (peers). Studies show that people in their late teens and twenties often evaluate their actions through the lens of how these actions are viewed by others, particularly their peers. (Choi, Charles. *Scientific American*, 2/1/2009). However, when challenged with this precept, the students generally dismiss this supposition, asserting that they are engaging in behavior that they have analyzed and deemed appropriate. Referring to Kohlberg's theory of moral development, the teens that I have worked with view divorcing themselves from their parents' morality as moving out of the realm of pre-conventional morality. Many teens with whom I have worked view their path to independent thought as an obstacle course where they shed the rules of their parents even if it means that a negative consequence will ensue. Since peer groups do not have the same overtly hierarchical structure, teens often fail to understand that the authority of the group influences behavior and results in conforming to social standards. Sometimes this authority is even more powerful than that of parents. The desire to fit in and belong is very strong in the teen mind, creating a group dynamic that is infused with the power to make others conform. Thus unbeknownst to them, the teens are trapped in a state of nonage unable to dissect the various peer and cultural influences that are inhibiting critical thinking and enlightenment. Teens with whom I have worked struggle to comprehend this idea in the abstract. However, they are able to grasp this concept if there is a concrete application. Using social media, film, music and television, students are engaged in an analytical and critical evaluation of the norms presented, where these norms converge and how these phenomena impact the quest for enlightenment. This analysis provides a foundation that uses platforms with which teens are comfortable to enable them to understand barriers that exist on the path to enlightenment. Using small group work and empirical analysis my project presents an understanding of the obstacles that are present when discussing enlightenment and nonage with teens and provides tangible guidelines that are easily replicated and help to allow teens in the 16-18 year old cohort to critically analyze the influences on decision making.

**Kathrin Bouvot (Genua/Italy)**

### **Rigid Identity Models as an Obstacle on the Way to Enlightenment Today**

The present phenomenon of global mass migration requires a new form of enlightenment in the sense of recognizing the danger of rigid identity concepts. The consequence of such an identity concept that is basing on the idea that every person consists of one rigid identity is the risk that a form of multiculturalism arises that is in reality a plural monoculturalism. With the term „plural monoculturalism“ is meant that there is a coexistence of countless parallel

societies that don't want to communicate with each other. Unemployment, poverty and a high incidence of crime are frequent consequences of such a *false* multiculturalism. In this context, Amartya Sen claims that the existence of a multiplicity of multicultural parallel societies cannot be automatically described with the term „multiculturalism“: „One important issue concerns the distinction between multiculturalism and what may be called „plural monoculturalism“. Does the existence of a diversity of cultures, which might pass each other like ships in the night, count as a successful case of multiculturalism? [...] In contrast, having two styles or traditions coexisting side by side, without the twain meeting, must really be seen as „plural monoculturalism“. The vocal defense of multiculturalism that we frequently hear these days is very often nothing more than a plea for plural monoculturalism.“ In my presentation I will show the reasons why such rigid identity models provoke the development of a *false* multiculturalism. A solution approach to reduce the risk that such a plural monoculturalism arises is offered by flexible identity models. They are, at the same time, the foundation stone for a successful integration and the precondition for the prevention of the emergence of poverty among immigrants. The aim of my presentation is to demonstrate that a possible reason behind the failure of integration and, as a resulting phenomenon of this failure, the arising of the phenomenon of a plural monoculturalism and of all specific problems correlated with it, are a too rigid identity theory because such a theory leads to intolerance amongs peoples and to segregation of certain population groups. The acceptance that every person consists of a plurality of identities and that the own identity is subject to a constant change process because of the fact that there are arriving permanently new identities makes it easier to be open to the supposed „foreign“ and „different“ persons. The acceptance of flexible identity models reduces any kind of reserves against certain population groups and, at the same time, it minimizes any tendency of racial segregation and of isolation of certain groups. Such an identity concept favors an atmosphere in which it is possible a respectful togetherness in peace including a good communicative basis without the enforcement that the counterpart has to give up his differences with the meaning of homogenization. Jonathan Sacks claims in his book *The Dignity of Difference. How to avoid the Clash of Civilisations* that conflicts between different cultures can be avoided if the differences between the cultures are interpreted as something of fundamental importance, as a value that has to be saved. For Sacks the reduction of cultural differences is not a solution approach for reducing conflicts between different cultures. Sacks argues that the existing cultural diversity must be saved and that the precondition of unity is diversity. A fruitful approach is offered by Sen's identity concept. Sen considers the identity as a cultural phenomenon that can be (within a certain frame) freely chosen and changed by the person. Sen stresses the importance of consolidating the idea that every person consists of a plurality of identities because he considers this identity concept as „the main hope of harmony in our troubled world [...].“ Sen considers the conception of a singular identity as an artificial construct. No person can be reduced to a singular and rigid identity: „In our normal lives, we see ourselves as members of a variety of groups – we belong to all of them. A person's citizenship, residence, geographic origin, gender, class, politics, profession, employment, food habits, sports interests, taste in music, social commitments, etc., make us members of a variety of groups. Each of these collectivities, to all of which this person simultaneously belongs, gives her a particular identity. None of them can be taken to be the person's only identity or singular membership category.“ In my presentation I will analyze why such rigid identity models have a high hazard potential although they don't exist in the sense that they don't correspond in no way with the relationship that a concrete man has with his identity in real life. The aim of my presentation is to discuss whether flexible identity models that are basing on the idea that every man is a sum of a plurality of different identities could improve the living together of persons with different cultural and religious backgrounds and whether such identity models

could alleviate or solve already existing problems, as for instance, violence and terrorism. I am interested in the question whether flexible identity models, as for instance Sen's identity concept, could be a solution approach for preventing the development of poverty and social isolation among immigrants and whether such identity models could influence political reform processes in the fight against racism. A new form of enlightenment is required. Every person must have the courage to rethink his or her identity.

**Daniela G. Camhy, Robert Gutounig (Graz/Austria)**  
**Digital Enlightenment? Critical Thinking & Media Literacy**

The rapid change of our present ways of life is mostly related to the fast changes in the scientific and technological world and its frequent innovations. Especially the digital media revolution has evoked positive as well as negative expectations. Lately the web & social media have come under criticism for emergent phenomena like hate speech, post-truth & fake news, criminal activities and so forth. We are overwhelmed with a flood of information and our minds are often filled with irrelevancies. There has been concern, that modern media are endangering our capacity to think. Are we losing our capacity to sift, discard and judge? On the other hand ideas such as equal access to information and open participation in social processes were linked to the concept of interconnected digital networks at quite early stages. Given these seemingly opposing views of online media we try to critically assess some of the positions on the topic of enlightenment in digital network structures in the first part of this paper. We analyze if ideas of enlightenment can be traced in the digital transformation making a recourse to some of its major philosophical concepts as well as to more recent contributions. The high dynamics of the related media forms require an interdisciplinary analysis of these phenomena, in order to better distinguish between their positive and negative implications. This will help us to understand where aspects of enlightenment are immanent in the digital revolution and where more engagement is needed. We see this as a foundation for establishing a link between media education and critical thinking.

In the second part of our paper we propose critical thinking as a framework which promotes a self-determined and rational way of dealing with online media, an idea very much connected with enlightenment. Especially in the era of the web critical thinking becomes more and more important. The development of a democratic society is connected with the idea of community and collaborative participation, shared responsibility, rational dialogue and deliberative judgement.

We live during a period in which the demands of knowledge and responsibility are tightly interwoven. Inaccessible, or poorly accessed, knowledge can quickly lead to disorientation, lack of interest and eventually to a problem of responsibility in society. This means that there is an increasing need for people to assume both individual and collective responsibility in relation to building knowledge. In this sense we see critical thinking as prerequisite for media literacy which constitutes a more elaborated form of media competence. This could lead to a better understanding of problems, to a better ability of judgement and after all to more individual autonomy.

**Nicole Decostre (Mons/Belgium)**  
**Lipman and the Resistance to the Degradation of Enlightenment**

When it comes to Enlightenment, we immediately refer to the British, German and French philosophers of the eighteenth century.

Could referring to those Enlightenment ideas provide us with a better understanding of our present days and make us feel ready for the future?

Don't we have our own enlightened thinkers, who are thriving on the richness of the technical and scientific evolution that makes them different from the historical philosophers of Enlightenment, but on the other hand seem to be threatened by those achievements?

Are the problems and the values cherished at that time still current?

With the wars and the genocides of the twentieth century, are we not allowed to speak of a total upheaval of the idea of progress?

Are there new factors of our present evolution that would be hostile to Enlightenment?

What can be Lipman's answer to those ancient and new challenges? The community of philosophical inquiry gives the opportunity to develop new ideas and gives new dimensions to the current ones while focusing on the knowledge and the experience of the participants.

Each of us could bring a new perspective on the behalf of the community.

**Ezgi Emel (Istanbul/Turkey)**

### **Enlightenment and its Critiques-Abstract**

In this essay I shall offer an overview of the Enlightenment critique from postmodernist philosophers such as Foucault, Horkheimer and Adorno; with primary focus of Michel Foucault's analysis of the concept of enlightenment and his reinterpretation of Kant's account. I will reinterpret Foucault's argument that criticises not Kant but his maximalist followers who sought to create a perfectly rational post-enlightenment world utopia. The themes that I shall be discovering include but not limited to are: *'being an historically situated intellectual agent'*; possibilities of *'thinking for oneself'* and *'the possibilities for having an authentic opinion'*. I will elaborate on the distinction between enlightenment as a socio-political project that seeks to take the society as a whole to an intellectually superior/autonomous level and the enlightenment as a personal project that will transform the individual into an intellectually emancipated rational agent. I shall also investigate whether the Kantian enlightenment ideal and the enlightenment concept of Buddhism have anything in common and try to draw parallels between the kind of intellectual/perceptual state-of mind that the Buddhist concept of enlightenment seeks to achieve. Finally I will seek to generate a concept of enlightenment that can lay out the threshold of free, critical, responsible thinking we should expect from one another as individuals in a society and the implications this threshold holds for the goal of Philosophy for Children program.

**Rainer Enskat (Halle/Germany)**

### **Aufklärung – für wen, wozu, über was?**

Kants Aufklärungs-Imperativ wird im Jahr 2017 im Rahmen dieses Internationalen Kongresses für Kinderphilosophie erneut zur Sprache gebracht. Er wird mit fast einem Dutzend Themen in Verbindung gebracht, die gegenwärtig einer aufgeklärten Behandlung zu bedürfen scheinen. Unter diesen Voraussetzungen werden zwei Spannungsfelder erzeugt, von denen sich schwer sagen läßt, ob und vor allem wie sie in fruchtbarer Weise aufgelöst werden können. Die Aufklärungs-Imperative und Aufklärungs-Maximen des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts hatten am allerwenigsten Kinder zu ihren Adressaten. Andererseits war das Wort Aufklärung in Europa schon am Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts unüberschaubar mehrdeutig geworden.

Als Kant und Moses Mendelssohn die Frage Was ist Aufklärung? 1784 mit Mitteln der Philosophie zum ersten Mal gestellt und zu beantworten gesucht haben, war dies bereits ein Akt semantischer Notwehr gegen den unüberschaubar vieldeutig werdenden Gebrauch des Wortes. Nach mehr als zweihundert Jahren und angesichts der nahezu weltweiten Verbreitung des Wortes und seiner Synonyme in fast allen lebendigen Sprachen hat sich die semantische Notwehr bis zur gänzlichen Hilflosigkeit verschärft. Angesichts dieser Situation suche ich einen Ausweg aus dieser Situation.

Ich setze voraus, dass die Aufklärung der Prozess der wichtigsten kognitiven Fortschritte ist; und ich beantworte die drei Leitfragen meines Vortrags in der folgenden Form: 1. Die wichtigste und förderungsbedürftigste Instanz der Aufklärung ist der individuelle Mensch. 2. Das wichtigste Medium, in dem sich der Grad der Aufklärung jedes individuellen Menschen zeigt, ist seine alltägliche Praxis. 3. Die wichtigste kognitive Fähigkeit, von der die Schritte im Prozess der Aufklärung abhängen, ist die praktische Urteilskraft jedes individuellen Menschen, also seine Fähigkeit da-rüber zu beurteilen, welches Wissen, welche Informationen und welche Handlungsweisen in einer konkreten Situation am besten und am nützlichsten sind. Im Vortrag soll gezeigt werden, welche Tragweiten diese elementaren Prämissen für Schwerpunkte aus dem Themenspektrum des Kongresses mit sich bringen.

**Elsa Haraldsdóttir (Reykjavík/Iceland)**

### **The Value and Enhancement of Philosophical Thinking**

Although discussions about the value and role of philosophy is almost as old as philosophy itself, the discussion is usually either rather general and detached from compulsory education and actual educational practices within schools. This applies to historical figures such as Kant, Rousseau, Schiller, Russell and many others. Moreover, even though great insights can be drawn from historical thinkers on the nature and relevance of philosophical thinking, contemporary society poses challenges which are new or at least different from historical contexts. One can mention the challenges introduced by Edward O. Wilson in his book *The Meaning of Human Existence* (2014), Robert Frodeman's and Adam Briggles' book *Socrates Tenured: The Institutions of 21st Century Philosophy* (2016), and Anthony Pagden's *the Enlightenment and Why It Still Matters* (2013). Their texts focus on the role of philosophy in society in general both in relation to the idea of the Enlightenment, the current compromises in regard to what we can know as truth or facts, how science are questioned but at the same time contribute to a rapid growth within technology, as seen within the vast questions artificial intelligence raises about the human condition. Finally, ethical question in regard to our existence and our relationship to nature and how we value the land we are living on in relationship to current threats of global warming.

All these elements relate to an argument for enhancing philosophy and philosophical thinking within education with a great emphasize on the role of the teacher. It is he who can open up the space for the dialogue or close it down, he also selects the teaching material, and he is also the one who may recognize philosophy in our "everyday element" and knows and understand how it can be taken further, what can contribute to it, and how it can be a source of learning and creativity. With an empirical research amongst teachers teaching philosophy the objectives are defining the significance of the teacher's knowledge and attitude in this regard. How much do we need to know about philosophy or philosophical thinking to be able to teach it or enhance it within others? Does the teacher need to *be* a philosopher to be able to enhance philosophical thinking?

**Hawken Johanna (Paris/France)**

**The Development of Intellectual Self-esteem and Legitimacy: a Foundation for the Conquest of Philosophical Audacity by Enlightened Children**

An enlightened mind isn't an overcharged intelligence bearing a vast quantity of knowledge, but an independent mind capable of analyzing the world in a clairvoyant manner. This Kantian definition is assorted with an injunction: "*Sapere aude!*", according to which every individual must have the courage to think for oneself, and cease, thereby, to be a minor. Therefore, a child can, paradoxically, emancipate himself from his status by acquiring intellectual autonomy: in this regard, the practice of philosophy can be crucial. But although Kant declares the importance of being an independent thinker, he doesn't detail the method to effect this transformation. One of the major obstacles to the construction of an enlightened subject is the fear and incapacity of embracing one's own intellectual autonomy. The pedagogical question becomes the following: how can philosophy guide children towards intellectual audacity and independence? What educational tools can we use to facilitate the emergence of the independent mind? Three didactic strategies have appeared pertinent during my experimental research as a facilitator of philosophical communities of inquiry in educational, social and cultural structures in the French town of Romainville (east of Paris).

The first didactic tool might seem inconsequential but is actually very effective: employing the empowering acts of language, such as playing with Socratic irony ("I only know that I know nothing"), communicating the presumption of equal intelligence and revealing the transfer of responsibility regarding the discovery of ideas. This educational lever is of a discursive nature - as it consists in symbolic declarations incorporated in verbal teaching practices - but it has major effects on children's perception of self as a valuable thinker and researcher.

Secondly, the philosophy workshop can create opportunities for what I call "cognitive successes": expressing questions in a way that federates a common search, formulating hypotheses to which everyone adheres, creating a pivotal moment in the discussion based on a determinant argument. All of these achievements experienced by the children can enhance their intellectual self-esteem, allowing them to develop conceptual audacity.

Thirdly, in order to have the courage to use critical thinking, I have created a game to dedramatize it, called "*Critical mind, in guard!*". Every child has two cards, one indicating "I agree because..." and the other "I don't agree because...". Given a philosophical question, a first student expresses his idea, then the facilitator says "*Critical mind, in guard!*" and the other participants raise one of their cards to explain their point of view. By playing down the act of criticism, while creating a habit of employing it, children cease to be intimidated by the act of taking position, and start to be accustomed to submitting every idea to the screen of their own mind.

In a word, the didactic challenge is to create a path that children can borrow in order to embrace their intellectual audacity, and accomplish thereby the first step towards intellectual autonomy. We can't just order them to have the courage to think: we must create the educational environment conducive to the feeling of legitimacy necessary to becoming an enlightened and autonomous thinker.

**Evelina Ivanova (Plovdiv/Bulgaria)**

**Die Fragen als Ausdruck von Erkenntnisinteressen (im Sinne von Habermas) oder wie können wir Philosophie und Lebenswelt der SchülerInnen im Unterricht zusammenbringen?**

Die These von Habermas über den Zusammenhang zwischen Erkenntnis und Interesse bildet den Ausgangspunkt für die Darstellung und Überprüfung von zwei philosophiedidaktischen Thesen über die Bedeutung der Fragen für die Erkenntnis.

These 1: *Der Zusammenhang zwischen Erkenntnis und Interesse zeigt sich in der Frage.* Daher ist das Aufstellen von *Untersuchungsfragen* ein Schlüsselmoment bei jeder Erkenntnis – gleichwohl ob bei wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis, philosophischer Untersuchung oder persönlicher Einsicht.

These 2: Die Fragen könnten drei wichtige Funktionen bei der Erkenntnis und im Unterricht erfüllen – *motivierende, fokussierende und strukturierende Funktion*, welche hier ganz kurz skizziert werden:

- motivierende Funktion der Fragen – Interesse wecken, Erfahrung Aktualisieren, Verbindung zwischen Untersuchungsfeld und Lebenserfahrung/Lebenswelt darstellen;
- fokussierende Funktion der Fragen – ein konkretes Problem in einem Forschungsfeld abgrenzen;
- strukturierende Funktion der Fragen – Einzelschritte in der Untersuchung abgrenzen, Teilaspekte formulieren, Reihenfolge bestimmen (intersubjektiv im Dialog bestimmbar).

An Beispielen aus den neuen Richtlinien für den Philosophieunterricht in Bulgarien und aus neuen Lehrbüchern (darunter wird besonders auf mein Lehrbuch für die 8. Klasse hingewiesen, welches ab dem Schuljahr 2017-2018 eingesetzt wird), kann man zeigen, wie die Fragen einen kompetenzorientierten Philosophieunterricht ermöglichen und ausschlaggebend unterstützen.

Auf dem Hintergrund der Auffassung über die Philosophie als Aufklärung (E. Martens), als bewusste Arbeit an der eigenen persönlichen Entwicklung, gewinnt der Zusammenhang zwischen Philosophie und Lebenswelt der SchülerInnen an immer größerer Bedeutung für einen sinnvollen und effektiven Unterricht.

**Marie Kerhom (Montpellier/France)**

**Using his own Understanding in the Context of Vocational Training for young Students. What kind of Education? What Kind of Tools?**

The ability for one to think by himself is the "everyone's vocation" declares E. Kant. That is why he exhorts everyone to come out the minority status, very convenient for all by exercising his own understanding.

But it is a very difficult action and "that is why there are only a few men who walk firmly, and who have emerged from nonage by cultivating their own minds". Although Kant writes that it is the "indecision and lack of courage to use one's own mind" that provides man from realising his vocation, could it not also and especially be an educational problem?

The ones facing this difficulty are mostly young students in vocational training. Indeed the education they receive aims, before everything, at the acquisition of knowledge, practical and professional capacities. What education in professional program would it allow, in addition to these knowledge and professional skills, to form also the autonomy of the thought?

Which tools could the teacher use to help these students to dare to think by themselves?

It seems to me that philosophy is the most suited scolar discipline for this because it clearly aims at this purpose: “enable access for each student to exercise reflexion and judgement”. But how can it be done in vocational training while there is a lack of philosophy?

Could not the introduction of the New Philosophical Practices in this cursus, and particularly the CRP (Lipman) and the DVDP (Tozzi) be a relevant and effective way to favor this movement? Because these two philosophical practices, amongst others, aim at the development of critical thinking. The latter is a form of particular thought, answering precise criteria, and most of the time assimilated as understanding.

So, could the introduction of these New Philosophical Practices in vocational training allows to go toward Kant’s wish: to work in order for man to fulfil his vocation, so that he can decide by himself and live as an enlightened man and citizen?

**Arie Kizel, Dorit Kershner (Haifa/Israel)**  
**Circles of Meaning in Philosophy with Children**

In our lecture, we will follow the meaning as a central theme in the philosophical thought of Matthew Lipman (1980, 1989, 1997, 2004). We will present the basic principles and main arguments of Lipman's philosophy, in relation to the theme of meaning. We will discuss the meaning motive, in Lipman's thought, in the context of engaging children in philosophy, presenting children's abilities to carry out a philosophical framework in a community of inquiry, and its contribution to child development components. The presentation is based on a systematic reading of most of his writings.

In *Philosophy in the Classroom*, Lipman refers in similar terms to the association between meaning and relationships—the meaning created in the relationships between the participants in the community of inquiry and the subject being discussed: “... meaning emerges from the perception of part-whole relationships as well as of means-ends relationships” (Lipman, 1980: 8). In other words, meaning is created as in a game or game-relations in precisely the same way as a word is understood from a sentence or an episode from the context of the film as a whole. Meaning is thus procedural.

We will present a map of the circles that can encourage meaning in the educational process in schools, according to Lipman's philosophy (1956, 1973, 1976, 1978). Those circles are: the creation of meaning in a child's life; social meaning; literacy meaning and cognitive meaning. Then we will analyze those circles from a wide point of view starting from Lipman's criticism of the educational field, in relation to the theme of meaning, to the alternatives he offered to enrich, extend and optimize the production of meaning in the educational process, which takes place in school.

One of the most important conclusions of our lecture is the direct connection between meaning and thinking, and if we look on thinking as a form of enlightenment today, we can learn a lot about the connection between enlightenment and education. Philosophy with children could cultivate developing a variety of thinking skills, like independent and critical thinking, and thereby also increases and enriches the circles of meaning in the educational process in school.

**Arie Kizel (Haifa/Israel)**

**Enabling Identity: The Challenge of Presenting the Silenced Voices of Repressed Groups in Philosophic Communities of Inquiry**

This lecture will focus on a theoretical conceptualization of the term *Enabling Identity* through the framework of Community of Philosophical Inquiry (Kizel, 2016). *Enabling Identity* seeks to endow a voice for children and adolescents from repressed groups by challenging the mainstream hegemonic discourse that governs the reality where Communities of Philosophical Inquiry operate.

The lecture will present a three-phase theoretical model, which depicts this enabling while relying on narrative theory (Sarbin, 1986; Riessman, 1993; Solis, 2004) as well as on the philosophical and dialogical work of Paulo Freire (1970, 1973) and Emmanuel Levinas (2003). Their philosophies will underpin the model's fundamental concepts.

This model presents three phases. During the first phase, the repressed voice challenges the hegemonic mainstream discourse. During this phase, the Community of Philosophical Inquiry requires certain dialogical tools that will enable practices that are underpinned by such concepts as the right to be heard, courage and equality.

At the second phase, the repressed voice will seek to dissolve the boundaries of the hegemonic discourse and will challenge its centrality and the seemingly unshakeable legitimacy of this centrality. During the process of the third phase, the two narratives—the hegemonic and the repressed—are coexisting in dialogue and in atmosphere of cooperation, empathy and mutual acquaintance, but also mutual legitimacy. At this phase, the presence of the two narratives becomes clear not just symbolically but also essentially. Therefore, the existence of this phase and in fact all phases require a democratic atmosphere and an interpretation of the concept *social compromise* which concedes neither group nor individual identity.

The integration of frameworks offered by narrative theory into Communities of Philosophical Inquiry, and vice versa, enables the creation of an enriching pedagogic space that: (i) theoretically legitimizes multiple narratives, (ii) allows children and teachers the freedom to engage in self-construction (iii), and uses narrative to recognize and go beyond their existing constructions and boundaries. This blending is of particular importance in multicultural societies in which the dialogue between narratives forms the basis for the existence of what Lipman calls "autonomy and self-government" (1991: 72).

**Eva Marsal (Karlsruhe/Germany)**

**„Philosophieren mit Kindern“ als „Enlightenment“-Methode der Kindheitsforschung**

Ich möchte in diesem Beitrag die Potenz des „Philosophieren mit Kindern“ als „Enlightenment“-Methode für die Kindheitsforschung skizzieren. Den Ausgangspunkt dafür bildet die symmetrische gemeinsame Forschungsarbeit in der *community of inquiry*, die als Exploration Phase dient. Neben der Steigerung seiner kritischen und kreativen Denkfähigkeiten sowie seiner sozialen, personalen und emotionalen Intelligenz klärt und erweitert das Kind hier im argumentativen reflexiven Diskurs auch seine Selbst – und Weltkonzepte sowie seine Subjektiven Handlungstheorien. Die Aufzeichnung dieses inter- und intrafundierten Forschungsprozesses ermöglicht Kindheitsforschern wie z. B. Entwicklungspsychologen die Gewinnung von

Forschungsdaten zu den kindlichen Konzepten aus der verbalisierten und kritisch überprüften Ich-Perspektive des Kindes heraus. Damit ist dieser Forschungsprozess näher am Kind, als die in der Entwicklungspsychologie üblicherweise praktizierten Designs wie Beobachtung, Interview, Dilemmata, Experiment oder Computersimulation. Deshalb verspricht die Rekonstruktion der Methode „Philosophieren mit Kindern“ als Forschungsstrategie eine größere Alltagstauglichkeit der Forschungsdaten und verringert so den Graben zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Inhaltlich passt die Forschungsmethode „Philosophieren mit Kindern“ in die Forschungslandschaft „Subjektive Theorien“, die mit Dialog-Konsens-Methoden operiert und inzwischen in der Erwachsenen- und Jugendforschung etabliert ist.

Ich fokussiere meine Ausführungen auf den Beitrag, den das Paradigma „Philosophieren mit Kindern“ für die Selbst- und Weltkonstruktion sowie den Subjektiven Theorien zu antizipierten potentiellen Handlungen leistet, da ich davon ausgehe, dass wir gerade in dieser Domäne einen spezifischen Beitrag zur Kindheitsforschung leisten können und zwar vor allem durch den interkulturellen Vergleich der Kindheitskonzepte. Das Alleinstellungsmerkmal wäre hier die Prüfperspektive aus der internen Ich-Perspektive heraus, die nicht nur reaktiv auf die Fragen einer Forscherin oder eines Forschers erfolgt, sondern aktiv aufgrund der eigenen Fragelinien der Kinder. Diese folgen dem „Enlightenment“-prinzip: Sapere aude! – Habe den Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen!\*

Als elaboriertes Beispiel möchte ich aber die Pilotstudie zum Naturverständnis von deutschen und kanadischen Kindern herausgreifen: „Nature Gives and Nature Takes“. Hierbei wurden die transkribierten Kinderaussagen inhaltsanalytisch ausgewertet. Das deduktiv-induktiv gewonnene philosophische Kategoriensystem umfasst die 4 Kategorien „*Definition*, *Gefühlsqualitäten*, *Werte / Stellenwert* und *Faszinosum*. Als Anregung für die Extrahierung der Argumente skizziere ich die 1. Kategorie: *Definition* und zeige daran den interkulturellen Vergleich auf.

### **Hermann Maurer (Graz/Austria)** **Ändert die Digitalisierung die Aufklärung?**

Unter Aufklärung versteht man meist die geistigen und sozialen Reformbewegungen ab ca. 1700, die versuchten, durch rationales Denken auf der Basis des eigenen Verstandes gegen behindernde Strukturen vorzugehen, wie es mit dem Motto der Aufklärung "Sapere aude!", oder auf Deutsch: "Habe Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen!" heißt. Durch Wissen (und neue Erkenntnisse) wollte man Antworten auf Fragen finden und Zweifel, Vorurteile oder falsche Annahmen ausräumen, auch gegen den Widerstand von Tradition und Gewohnheitsrecht. Es wurde also die menschliche Vernunft zum Maßstab eines jeden Handelns erklärt, was philosophisch auch als Rationalismus von „Ratio“ für Vernunft gesehen werden kann.

Damit war man gegen übertriebene Religion, Mystik, das Feudalsystem, der oft untergeordneten Stellung der Frauen, usw. So sehr man auch heute unterstützen muss dass unser Verstand unsere Handlungen leiten soll, kann man den Fortschrittsglauben, der auch oft in der traditionellen Aufklärung zu finden ist kritisieren, wie das in der Romantik und im politischen Konservatismus geschah. Insgesamt ist aber auch heute die Aufklärung im erwähnten Sinn, aber ohne den unbedingten Glauben an den Fortschritt (darum ist oben „neue Erkenntnisse“ in Klammern) positiv zu sehen, ja kann man auch z.B. die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte der Vereinten Nationen vom Dezember 1948 der Tradition der Aufklärung zuordnen.

Ich werde in meinem Vortrag argumentieren, dass sich die prinzipiellen Ziele der Aufklärung durch die Digitalisierung nicht geändert haben, wohl aber (a) die Art, wie die Aufklärung erfolgt als auch (b), eine neue Arten von Gefahren, die man bekämpfen muss.

Zu (a) gehört die Tatsache, dass Wissen nicht mehr vorwiegend aus einigermaßen verlässlichen Buchquellen kommt, sondern heute sehr stark über die Medien (Zeitschriften, Radio, Fernsehen), Kommunikation über Smartphones und das Internet mit seinen über eine Milliarde Websites und zahlreichen „social networks“ erfolgt. Damit ist die Verbreitung von Wissen leichter und schneller geworden.

Gerade das führt aber zu (b), zu gravierenden Gefahren: Das Internet hat sich in letzter Zeit durch ein starkes Anwachsen von „fake news“ „ausgezeichnet“; „social networks“ führen z.B. sehr stark zur Wissensweitergabe nicht von erfahrenen zu weniger erfahrenen Menschen, sondern zum Austausch von Wissen in bestimmten Altersgruppen; die Netzwerke und Kommunikationsmittel verleiten dazu, dass oft nicht das Wichtige, sondern das Sensationelle transportiert wird. Medien legen zunehmend weniger Wert auf Richtigkeit als auf Aufmerksamkeit, der Glauben an gewisse Strömungen (von Esoterik zu neuen Diäten, von medizinischen Behandlungsmethoden bis zu unhaltbaren Ansichten über Verkehr oder Klimawandel) unterliegen einem Hype, sodass Menschen einer laufenden Gehirnwäsche unterzogen werden, wie ich an Hand einiger Beispiele zeigen werde. Dazu gehört die Dominanz einer potentiell gefährlichen „Schwarmintelligenz“, wie das Ferdinand von Schirach in seiner Rede zur Eröffnung der Salzburger Festspiele 2017 formulierte:

„Das Internet hat das Gefüge der Demokratie verändert“, erinnerte von Schirach (...). Nie zuvor hätten die Menschen so deutlich ihre Stimme erheben können; aus früheren Empfängern seien durch Soziale Medien nun auch Sender geworden. „Die Wähler sollen unmittelbar an den Entscheidungen beteiligt werden, die Bürger wüssten am besten, ‚was ihr Staat‘ braucht, (...) keine Mittler sollen mehr zwischen den Bürgern und der politischen Entscheidung stehen (...) und Volksentscheide in großem Umfang möglich werden“, skizzierte von Schirach die von der „Schwarmintelligenz“ geprägte Gehirnwäsche. Dass dies auch gefährlich sein kann, liegt auf der Hand!

### **Rudolf Meer (Graz/Austria)**

#### **Immanuel Kant und die Herausforderung einer sich selbst aufklärenden Vernunft**

Immanuel Kant beginnt die *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in der ersten Auflage von 1781 mit folgender Feststellung: „Die menschliche Vernunft hat das besondere Schicksal [...]: daß sie durch Fragen belästigt wird, die sie nicht abweisen kann; denn sie sind ihr durch die Natur der Vernunft selbst aufgegeben, die sie aber auch nicht beantworten kann, denn sie übersteigen alles Vermögen der menschlichen Vernunft.“ (A VII) Bemerkenswert ist dabei, dass sich diese Feststellung nicht am Ende des Buches quasi als Ergebnis einer kritischen Untersuchung findet, sondern als Ausgangspunkt dient. Das „Bewußtsein meiner Unwissenheit“, formuliert Kant in der *Transzendentalen Methodenlehre* diesen Aspekt erläuternd, ist, „statt daß es meine Untersuchungen endigen sollte, [...] vielmehr die eigentliche Ursache, sie zu erwecken.“ (A 758/B 786) Das Unwissen liegt damit – entgegen einer philosophischen Tradition im Anschluss an Platon – am Anfang und nicht am Ende des Philosophierens.

Die *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* wird damit zum Manifest der Aufklärung und ihre Anfangspassage ist an subversiver Kraft kaum zu überschätzen. Kant schließt sich darin erstens der an der Aufklärung geübten Kritik an Thron und Altar an, indem er den Menschen als Vernunftwesen bestimmt, welches durch Fragen belästigt wird, für welche das scheinbare Wissensmonopol und die Machtansprüche externer Autoritäten zu kurz greifen. Zweitens versteht Kant den Prozess der Aufklärung nicht nur als Ankurbelung der Bewegung hin zu

mehr Wissen und Fortschritt oder als Forderung nach mehr Toleranz, mehr Emanzipation etc., sondern als Kritik an der Vernunft – ihrer Grenzen und Möglichkeiten (B 25). Der kritische Anspruch Kants richtet sich demnach auch gegen die Aufklärung selbst, wodurch ihr Prozess *selbstreflexiv* (Hutter, 2009, 72) wird (Allison, 2012, 230; Ferrone, 2013, 28f.; La Rocca, 2011, 103f.).

Im Zentrum des Vortrags steht die Frage, inwiefern es Kant gelingt, im Rahmen der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* einen Vernunftbegriff zu konzipieren, der mit den kritischen Ansprüchen der Aufklärung in Einklang zu bringen ist: Wie kann die Vernunft der oberste Prüfstein aller Rechte und Ansprüche sein, ohne dem von Kant an die *alten Vormünder* gerichteten Vorwurf des Despotismus ausgesetzt zu sein? An dieser historischen Entwicklung der Problemstellung hängt damit auch die Frage der Rolle von Aufklärung heute sowie ihre Funktion in Wissenschaft und Erziehung. Der Vortrag folgt dabei einem Aufbau in vier Teilen: In Kapitel eins wird Kants Vernunftkonzeption skizziert, um daran anschließend in Kapitel zwei die Problemstellungen einer *Aufklärung der Aufklärung* zu thematisieren. Kapitel drei wird – ausgehend vom Stand der Forschung und mit besonderem Bezug auf O. O’Neill (1989, 1992 und 1996) – Kants Lösungspotenzial dieser Fragestellung entwickeln und diskutieren, um in einem abschließenden Teil in Form eines Resümees Konsequenzen und Herausforderung daraus zu ziehen.

**German Melikhov, Alexey Melikhov (Kazan/Russia)**

**The Enlightenment is Delayed. Can we Discuss “Maturity” outside of Kant's Understanding of Philosophizing?**

Kant's understanding of the Enlightenment is connected with the notion of “maturity of soul”. A “mature person”, first of all, has the courage to use his or her own mind, and he or she does not make other people decide things that should be decided by his or herself. Secondly, it's a person that does not fight with others, but fights with his or her own self. With their own laziness, cowardice and prejudices. Thirdly, a mature person has an ability to think critically (the position of a scholar that is not dependent on a social position given by education, a “public implementation of one's mind”). Finally, a mature person can set limits for themselves. He or she while doing something, presents not themselves, but “their craft” (a “private implementation of one's mind”). Therefore, Kant's understanding of the Enlightenment is connected with epistemological, ethical and social assumptions.

The most important epistemological assumption of Kant's philosophy is the principle of transcendentalism. A person does not interact with the world itself. The world always appears to him or her in the forms defined by mind. All our knowledge is inseparable from the features of our thinking. The world (as a place of becoming mature) is the space of our thinking. Philosophical thinking (based on the principle of transcendentalism) has one feature that was perfectly described by Heraclitus: “Those who speak with understanding must hold fast to what is common to all as a city holds to its law, and even more strongly”. A mature or thinking person clings not to their own, private, momentary, but to common, to what can bear meaning for everybody and nobody (what is valuable in itself). Any rational person cannot ignore this kind of thinking. He or she seek an encounter with it. This kind of thinking places us into the world just by the very fact of thinking. Not because we think about the world, but because we just think (at least sometimes). How can such kind of thinking be delayed!? The philosophical thinking has the power of ethical imperative and serves as the foundation of every social connection.

Historicist M. Foucault refuses Kant's transcendentalism. He understands the Enlightenment from the ethic-political point of view as a critical reflexive work with yourself (ethics, a self-transformation of an individual into a subject of a responsible action) and with your present (politics, what can be done today in order to implement the freedom of public usage of mind?). M. Foucault shifts the accents. He understands "common" as a historical notion and philosophical thinking as a tool. If thinking places us somewhere, it places us only in present, not into the unity of the world. People become mature by fighting with present because your present, your time is yourself.

Well. It is possible.

However, is it possible to talk about becoming mature without Kant's transcendentalism? Can I be considered myself when I am presented only in the forms of my present? Maybe we delay the work of self-improvement when we devote ourselves to the fight with present even if it is our present? Maybe it demands the thing of another scale for a person to become mature: the world as a unity, not the passing present?

**Desiree Moodley (Capetown/ South-Africa)**

### **Critical Thinking Practice in Pre-service Teacher Preparation: From Pedantic Ignorance toward Pedagogical Enlightenment**

Critical times demand critical thought and action. In an age tarnished by terror, intolerance and hate, children remain vulnerable and victim (Report of Youth for Human Rights International, 2016), and education continues to be challenged by political and societal upheavals. There is a dire need for critical thinking skills and dispositions to create awareness, understanding and enlightenment of the self and of others to deal with change and transformation. Moreover, classrooms remain teacher-centred spaces of pedantic regurgitation and rote memorisation. Research confirms a disjuncture between school, college, and systems expectations in meeting the needs of individual and social advancement (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Cochran-Smith & Villegas, 2015; Darling-Hammond, 2010; Kizel, 2015), revealing a serious gap for a socially relevant education that meets academic and social advancement in higher order and critical thinking skills and dispositions

A disconnect exists between meeting the needs of diversity and appropriate teacher expertise in fostering critical awareness and understanding for enlightenment. Teacher preparation programs do not adequately prepare future educators to deal with diversity, and often does not effectively prepare future educators to teach for critical thinking.

Literature in critical thinking practice claims that thinking critically is a skill and an art which can be instilled and practiced for individual and social advancement in education (Kizel, 2015; Lipman, 1988; 1998; Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1980; Schiering, 2016). Philosophy for Children (P4C) and the Interactive Methodology (IM), employing philosophical inquiry, critical, creative, co-operative, and caring thinking and dialogue are important best practice models worth investigating (Kizel, 2015; Lipman, 1998; Schiering, Bogner, & Buli-Holmberg, 2011; Schiering, 2016; Topping & Trickey, 2013). Significantly, framed within situated learning theory (Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 1996; Bandura, 1977; Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Vygotsky, 1978) undergirding the work of Lipman (1996) and Schiering (2016), critical thinking, underpinned

in metacognitive, situated, dialogical, experiential, and intentional practices requires explicit engagement within pre-service teacher learning.

This paper reviews literature that explores the ways that critical thinking pedagogical practice may be fundamental to pre-service teacher preparation toward an enlightened 21<sup>st</sup> century model of education making the case for explicit consideration within pre-service teacher programs. This study proposes to explore contributions, complexities, and contradictions of critical thinking practice in pre-service teacher preparation to address the research question: In what ways are pre-service teachers prepared (or not) to foster critical thinking skills and dispositions in their students from diverse backgrounds and cultures toward a socially enlightened society?

The call to visioning an enlightened education today for a socially just society requires courage, persistence and resolve (Zuniga, 2013). Developing awareness and knowledge of the interconnectedness and complexities of 21<sup>st</sup> century diverse societies requires a vision and will for explicitly enabling voices (Kizel, 2015), shaping identities, renewing hope and respect for all. It is hoped that this empirical study may contribute to bridging divides that separate teacher and learner, school and society, and peoples from each other, worthy of investigation for 21<sup>st</sup> century pre-service teacher preparation from pedantic ignorance toward a model of pedagogical enlightenment in education today.

**Guiseppe Motta (Graz/Austria)**

**Die Stadt aus Glas - Voltaires parodistischer Entwurf eines ewigen Friedens auf Erden**

Im Jahr 1761 verfasst Voltaire unter dem Titel *Rescrit de l'Empereur de la Chine* die Parodie einer Schrift, welche kurze Zeit vorher Rousseau dem Thema des ewigen Friedens gewidmet hatte. Das kleine Pamphlet Voltaires gilt als die schärfste Kritik aller philosophischen Versuche im 18. Jahrhundert, den ewigen Frieden in Europa zu etablieren. Jedoch ausgerechnet dank und mit dieser zerstörerischen Ablehnung Voltaires, können wir jetzt versuchen, die Realisierbarkeit selbst dieses (utopischen?) Projekts besser zu definieren.

**Sofia Nikolidaki (Athen/Greece)**

**The Role of Epiphany Moments when Doing Philosophy with Children**

Epiphany is a rare experience of sudden and striking realisation which is often related to describe scientific breakthrough, religious or philosophical discoveries, but it can also apply in any situation in which an enlightening realization allows a problem or situation to be understood from a new and deeper perspective. Epiphany is often generated by a complex combination of experience, memory, knowledge, predisposition and context. It is much connected with the creative process and often takes place after a period of incubation. An example of epiphany in education might involve the process by which a student (or a teacher) arrives at some form of new insight or clarifying thought. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possible emergence of epiphany moments when doing philosophy with children within a community of inquiry context. The essence, the characteristics and the impact of epiphany moments on the ones involved in a philosophical inquiry will be further investigated theoretically and practically based on teachers' and students' accounts. Presuppositions and dispositions that enable epiphany moments such as being passionate and in love with a stimulus, working hard to uncover the stimulus hidden aspects, dialoguing and

allowing periods of idleness for ideas to settle down are also going to be analysed within a philosophical community of inquiry. Finally, it will be argued that epiphany moments no matter how rare and unpredictably occur if they are recognised and freely expressed, they allow a fulfilling feeling which is surprising because one cannot predict when one's labour will bear fruit and it can be seen as a reward for a long period of effort.

**Jinwhan Park (Jinju/South Korea)**  
**Creating Self in Postmodern Era**

Western concept of enlightened self has been criticized many ways. Its limitation of narrowness because it neglects of emotional part of self. It neglects possibility of change or education because it assumes objectivity. It does not allow different concept because it assumes universality. In postmodern era, there are many different concepts coexist in same society. Nevertheless we do not know which one is better. Creating authentic and admirable self is the one of most important educational subject in postmodern era.

This paper deals with creating self in context of P4c creative thinking education.

**Ivana Putanovic (Belgrade/Serbia)**

**Make one Step Further into Enlightenment - What is Enlightenment, what Influence Enlightenment and how to Bring it Back Over and Over Again?**

Enlightenment as one period in history had a significant influence on educational and social reform. In nowadays, enlightenment as a term is not very often used in teaching-learning process. The question is how we can speak about enlightenment when we discuss about it. How much enlightenment is present in teaching-learning process, we can see through giving a chance to students to express their own understanding. Considering changes such as globalization and influence of new technology and media, there are different potentials for bringing back enlightenment.

In every aspect of life we are facing with influence of new technologies and media, the question is how all these social-constructive tools could be used in process of enlightenment. Are we learning students the right skills at schools to cope with fast moving and changing world. How new technology influence process of communication and dialogue?

Students can learn about process of communication using technology, but they also have to think and to analyze this process to improve their communication competences. Differences between dialogue and process of communication is easy to understand if we analyze these two processes through using social media or technology. Could technology enhance dialogue or its role is only to make it easy process of communication?

Using social media and technology provides special conditions for communication, meeting different perspective and points of view and possibility for expressing your own way of thinking. Is it enough that we can speak about enlightenment?

Enlightenment in teaching-learning process depend on the organization of teaching-learning process and what is expected from students. What kind of knowledge will teach student to think and to be good citizens? Considering type of knowledge in teaching-learning process we can assume if enlightenment would appear and what we can get from it. Building community of inquiry enlightenment is incorporated in process of communication and developing dialogue.

**Gianluigi Segalerba (Vienna/Austria)**

**Enlightenment is Uncovering: on the Analysis of Unmasking Processes by Means of Amartya Sen's Thinking**

In my contribution, I would like to show that the value of the enlightenment today consists in the uncovering of deception strategies, being present especially, but not only, in the political scene, aiming at persuading individuals that there is no alternative to certain ways of thinking, to certain ways of organizing societies, to certain ways of interpreting concepts, that is, aiming at persuading individuals that a kind of single thought rules and that it is right that it be so. While individuals, in general, are victim of these strategies, children, in particular, prove to be the main victims of these same strategies.

I will develop my contribution through the analysis of some aspects of Amartya Sen's philosophy. My principal aim will consist in finding, with the help of Sen's observations, instruments in order to show that enlightenment today first of all means – at least in my opinion – the process of uncovering that concepts and events are not so simple and not so univocal as they very often are presented. For instance, a concept like “development” can find interpretations that are very different from each other, depending whether development is exclusively identified with economic and income growth, or, alternatively, depending whether development is to be interpreted as the whole growth of the capabilities and freedoms both of the individual and of the society (the second interpretation corresponds to Sen's interpretation of the concept “development”).

Sen's thinking can be portrayed as a teaching against fatalism, indifference, resignation and inaction, on the one side, and as an appeal to the assumption of one's own responsibilities, on the other side: Sen wants to uncover the deep roots of fatalism, since fatalism is, actually, not neutral, but, on the contrary, aims at concealing precise responsibilities. Sen fights both in economics and in ethics against every kind of concealing, behind an unavoidability allegedly dictated by nature, failures actually due to human mistakes: unavoidable destiny is, actually, not so unavoidable as someone would like to present it.

Sen's project regarding development and freedom is a project of uncovering deception strategies: for instance, Sen's opinion that famines are not a natural, but a social phenomenon aims at uncovering all attempts to present famines as something unavoidable, in relation to which the only solution is resignation; Sen clearly uncovers that all those presenting famines as natural phenomenon, actually want to conceal their own responsibilities for the occurring of famines. Hunger and famines are not, in other words, natural phenomena against which there is nothing to do; they are social phenomena having precise responsible agents; neither do famines represent an integral, constitutive, unavoidable element of the modern world: they can be prevented, if there is the political will to prevent them. Sen continuously aims at promoting the control of government and of public authority: governments try to blame on nature the cause of catastrophes, whereas the causes of social catastrophes are to be connected to the inefficiency of governments.

Sen's meditation proves to be a continuous defence and promotion of democracy, rights and freedom against all attempts to diminish their value: in particular, Sen sees democracy as a system which is compatible with economic growth, thus opposing all those who considers democracy as an obstacle to economic growth. My attention will, thereafter, be concentrated on Sen's interpretation of the concept of development, which in Sen's opinion cannot be limited to the income of the individuals or to the growth of GNP, but should be extended to individuals' freedoms, human rights, health care, opportunities of education and further entitlements: Development is, in Sen's opinion, the progressive growth of the individual

capabilities, whereas all interpretations of development basing only on the measurement of the gross domestic product and of the individual income are insufficient. I will finally refer to Sen's pointing out the perils related to the absolute view of the cultural identity, if this view is connected to economic and political strategies: certain interpretations of cultural identities do bring about catastrophes, as it can be shown by means of the attitudes of British politicians towards Irishmen as possessing an inferior culture during the Irish famines, or by the attitudes of British politicians towards Indians during the Great Bengal famine).

**Maja Soboleva (Marburg/Germany)**  
**Die Antinomie der politischen Vernunft**

In dem Vortrag wird ein Versuch unternommen, aufgrund der Analyse des berühmten Aufsatzes „Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung“ Kants Begriff des Bürgers zu rekonstruieren. Es wird gezeigt, dass dieser Begriff folgende Aspekte enthält: den Begriff der politischen Vernunft und den Begriff der Menschenwürde.

Der Begriff der politischen Vernunft erhält bei Kant den Charakter einer Antinomie. Die Antinomie der politischen Vernunft entsteht infolge dessen, dass jeder Mensch zugleich der Bürger eines bestimmten historischen Staats und der Bürger einer nur imaginären Republik der universalen Vernunft ist. Er ist daher einerseits der Loyalität gegenüber dem Staat und andererseits dem kritischen Denken verpflichtet. Die Lösung dieser Antinomie verbindet Kant mit dem Begriff des „reinen Gewissens“. Dies bedeutet, dass der Bürger die Ideologie des Staates vertreten kann, solange dies mit den Vernunftprinzipien nicht konfliktiert. Am Rande sei bemerkt, dass diese Denkfigur in der politischen Philosophie Hannah Arendts eine bedeutende Rolle spielte und den Eingang in moderne politische Debatte gefunden hat.

Diese Überlegungen Kants setzen voraus, dass der Bürger als reales konstitutives Element der Politik zu denken ist. Dies hat zur Folge, dass der Begriff „Würde“ als ein normativer und zugleich als ein normbildender Begriff für die politische Praxis zu denken ist. Somit wurden die grundlegenden Prinzipien einer aufklärerischen politischen Ordnung formuliert.

Man kann schlussfolgern, dass im Unterschied zu dem System der theoretischen Vernunft, das einer „Kopernikanischen Wende“ unterworfen werden soll, bleibt das Kantische System der praktischen Vernunft durchaus Ptolemäisch. Der Mensch ist der einzige Gesetzgeber und der einzige nicht reduzierbare Wert in dieser von ihm selbst geschaffenen sozialen Welt.

**Carlos Francisco de Sousa Reis, Maria das Dores Formosinho (Coimbra/Portugal)**  
**Reconstructing Pedagogical Reason within a Contemporary Reading of Enlightenment**

We start by discuss the educational project in the framework of Modernity, Enlightenment and Bildung, while trying to present a critical characterization of its historical emergence, along with the underlying of the innovative contributions and eventual shortcomings. In particular we refer to the substantialist, a priori, solipsistic, and supposedly transcendent conception of the subject, which gave way to a set of insularizing and denaturalizing illusions, along with the monological metanarratives that cloister education. On the positive side, we stress the proposal of autonomous reasoning, free from all tutelage, understood as expressive and conditional of human intrinsic dignity, which leads to a new understanding of the educational process and the foreseeing of a society proactively conjugating human beings as entitled to be considered as “ends in themselves”. It follows an analysis of the postmodern deconstruction by identifying its points of impact, namely, the concepts of reason, truth, discourse and the teleological reading of education. After discussing Postmodernity

contributions regarding the appreciation of difference and multiculturalism, along with the refusal of any kind of absolutizing procedures, we also debunk the perplexities and dead ends it has brought forth. After referring to postmodern approaches that rely on the simple parodies of “traditional” philosophy, as well as to the argumentative weakness discovered behind the opaque language of sensationalist effect and the simple unreasonable nature of some of its approaches, we focus on: the tendency to refuse all kind of aims and objectives for education; the proposal of a non-identity pedagogy; the dismissal of imparting all kind of predefined knowledge corpus through education; aside with the discard of what is called the “novel of self-formation”, supposedly constructed by Enlightenment to define education as a normative process aimed at propitiating an spurious autonomy at the price of accepting certain social limitations. We conclude by pointing out towards a new Enlightenment or Metamodernity, which could rely on a participatory reason (Herrerías, 2009a) in order to give way to the critical, dialogic and intersubjective reconstruction of the Pedagogical Reason (Gonzálvez, 2010).

**Gideon Stiening (Munich/Germany**

**Selbstermächtigung falscher Freunde?**

**Zu den Formen historiographischer Aufklärungskritik und deren Folgen**

Seit jeher wurden die unterschiedlichen Strömungen der Aufklärung und deren Entwicklungen durch eine ebenso facettenreiche wie leidenschaftliche Kritik begleitet. Dies gilt auch für die Gegenwart, in der selbst nach 40 Jahren poststrukturalistischer Aufklärungskritik scheinbar stets neue kritische Perspektiven auf das Projekt eines „Wandels durch Vernunft“ (Schmidt) entworfen werden können. Solcherart ‚Gegenaufklärung‘ wirkt auch nachhaltig in der aktuellen historischen Forschung. An drei Beispielen (Andreas Pecar, Damian Tricoire: Falsche Freunde, 2015; Steffen Martus: Aufklärung, 2015; Arbogast Schmitt: Wie aufgeklärt ist die Vernunft der Aufklärung, 2016) sollen die Formen, Voraussetzungen und Verfahren von Aufklärungskritik der aktuellen historischen Forschung betrachtet werden sowie insbesondere deren Konsequenzen für ein Aufklärungsverständnis des 21. Jahrhunderts.

**Lino Veljak (Zagreb/Croatia):**

**Die Grenzen der Aufklärung**

Die Aufklärung stellt den wichtigsten Moment der modernen Welt dar. Doch, die Widersprüche der Aufklärung („Doppelcharakter der Aufklärung“ von Horkheimer und Adorno) determinierten auch die Widersprüche unserer gegenwärtiger Welt (z. B. die Hegemonie des „Positivismus des Faktischen“, welcher die bestehenden gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse als notwendige darstellt und welcher – laut Nietzsche - hinter seinen Objektivitätsidealen und den Wahrheitsansprüchen und hinter den asketischen Idealen und den Richtigkeitsansprüchen der universalistischen Moral Selbsterhaltungs- und Herrschaftsimperative verbirgt; die Mithologie des wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritts als Schlüssel für universelle Befreiung und Glück, usw.).

Folgt aber daraus, dass die Menschheit die Aufklärung durch den Irrationalismus, den Obskurantismus und die Rückfahrt zum vormodernen (angeblich authentischen) Organismus wechseln dürfen? Die Antwort auf diese Frage muss eindeutig negativ sein.