Seite - 72 - in Austrian Law Journal, Band 1/2015

ALJ 1/2015 Alexander Somek 72 developed for GIIPS economies becomes generalized in the context of the European semester and may even amount to Europe’s new—liberal and residual—social model.44 Evidently, also in this context, participation by parliaments really does not play a role. Rather, Member States receiving financial assistance subject to conditionality on a precautionary basis are subject to enhanced surveillance.45 Those Member States that receive financial assistance from one or several other Member States or third countries, the EFSM, the ESM, EFSK or the IMF are required to draw up macroeconomic adjustment programs.46 These are to be harmonized with Memoranda of Under- standing concluded between the Member State the relevant financial institution.47 The Commission (in liaison with the ECB and possibly also the IMF) is in charge of monitoring the progress48 made by the Member State and of examining (with the Member State) whether the adjustment program needs to be “updated”.49 In the event that a state experiences “insufficient administrative capacity” or other significant problems in implementing the program it has to seek “technical assistance from the Commission, which may constitute, for that purpose, groups of experts composed of members from other Member States and other Union institutions or from relevant international institu- tions.”50 Such a capacity building group may actually take residence in the Member State concerned. This emergent picture of top-down and peer group governance is complemented by the fact that, aside from lip service paid to the social partners,51 national parliaments are merely assured their right to invite Commission members to an “exchange of views” before their relevant committee.52 This is a rather blatant way of admitting the national parliaments do not matter. All of these regulations have one feature in common that goes to the heart of the rule of law. For the outside observer, at any rate, they comprise a rather confusing array of procedures that are supposed to “complement”53 their recently introduced predecessors. De facto they are just grafted upon one another. Apparently, only those “in the know” or “in charge” will know how to knit their own procedural routines from a web of ever increasing complexity. Evidently, the powerlessness on the part of the Union to adopt national budgets—in neoliberal political newspeak: its lack of “own- ership” of national budgetary processes—gives rise to a nasty overregulation of the national politi- cal progress that benefits those pulling the overlapping regulations together in the course of their application. 44 See Tsoukala, note 19 at 66, 74-75. 45 See Article 2(3) and (4) Regulation 472/2013. 46 Article 7(1) Regulation 472/2013. If the Member State is already in an economic partnership program pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation 473/2013 the adjustment program shall build upon it or replace it. 47 See Article 7(2)(2) Regulation 742/2013. 48 See Article 7(5) Regulation 742/2013. 49 See Article 7(5) Regulation 742/2013. 50 Article 7(8) Regulation 742/2013. 51 One provision is repeatedly to be found in the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, which says that the appli- cations of the relevant regulations “should be in full compliance with Article 152 TFEU”, which recognizes the im- portance of social partners and pays respect to national systems of wage formation. Moreover, the regulations claim to take into account Article 28 of the Fundamental Rights Charter, which guarantees the integrity of sys- tems of collective bargaining. See, for example, Article 1(2) Regulation 473/2013. This means, in practice, howev- er, is that the Member State is left to its own devices when it comes to dealing with social partners with “a view to contributing to building consensus over its content” (Article 8 of Regulation 472/2013). In clear language, this means that the Member States governments are expected to appease the representatives of labour and to communicate the necessity of harsh “adjustments”. 52 See Article 8(9) of Regulation 472/2013. 53 See Article 1(1) of Regulation 473/2013 listing five procedural contexts that enhanced monitoring of budgetary policies is supposed to complement. Evidently, potential collisions are supposed to be “harmonized” in practice. See recitals 5 and 6 of Regulation 472/2013.