Seite - 80 - in Austrian Law Journal, Band 1/2015

ALJ 1/2015 Alexander Somek 80 vidual would make his choices “democratic”. But saying that the president (or, for that matter, the Central Bank) is the voice of the people would stretch our understanding of democracy consider- ably since the president (or the Central Bank) could then legitimately aggregate preferences in an authoritarian manner. That is, he could claim vis-à-vis all individuals concerned to be blessed with greater insight. Exempting oneself from challenges by claiming greater insight is, however, not a move that is available to participants in democratic debates. Bodies invested with delegated authority can at best be conceived of as extensions of democratic institutions. But, similar to crutches, they are not part of the body. IX. The trust trap In the manner in which the Union presents itself in everyday life it is about accomplishments. It is supposed to be good for peace among European nations and to benefit “the consumer.” Delega- tions of authority to the Union would be democratic only if the Union’s doings could be debated, contested and undone within one larger constituency. Yet, we do not avail of it, at least not in the full-fledged form in which public contestation feeds directly into constitutional reform. In excep- tional cases, European voters express their critical voice—such as in the notorious French and Dutch referenda—but only in order to be told by political elites that they had been too stupid to understand the question. It is on these occasions that the European Union reveals its authoritari- an face. If there is a lack of opportunity to undo delegations in democratic fora the people remain locked into what might be called the trust trap. If they are not given an outlet to assert their expectations normatively (“This is what we want and you ought to deliver”) they shift, automatically, into the cognitive mode (“Okay, we can’t have it”). They begin to “learn.” They adapt to what appears to them to be the way of the world. High unemployment, rising inequalities, eroding social stand- ards, broken lives, meaningless biographies—apparently, this is as good as it gets in a post- utopian world. Europeans surrender their judgement: “Es ist so bequem, unmündig zu sein ” 86 (it is so convenient to receive guidance from others). To be sure, the democratic defectiveness of the Union is not caused by the absence of political rights or the widespread repression of political opinion. Rather, it is a by-product of its structure. While resistance against European Union policies is pointless at home, it is largely homeless in the Union. European voters have no party system to connect to and there is no electoral process that would allow for real choices concerning the course of European public policy.87 This is not so say that this cannot change in the future.88 Today, however, those Europeans who learn and adapt are perceived to be “reasonable.” They demonstrate to have understood that obedience is good for them, at least when they have been told to be obedient. There is no alternative. 86 Immanuel Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? in 11 WERKE IN ZWÖLF BÄNDEN 53, 53 (W. Weischedel ed., Insel 1968). 87 See Mattias Kumm, Why Europeans will not embrace constitutional patriotism, 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITU- TIONAL LAW, 2008, at 117. 88 It must not be ignored, however, that the European Union is so overconstitutionalised, in particular as regards its economic constitution, that there is not much room left for political choices.