Seite - 45 - in Austrian Law Journal, Band 1/2017

ALJ 1/2017 Non-State Law in Nigeria 45 Additionally, there are some prerequisites for applying customary law that are expressly provided for under Evidence Act. And they are based primarily on two grounds, either of which must be ascertained before a particular custom can be invoked in any case: 1. where the custom sought to be relied upon by any individual or group has been established in the form of judicial notice. This means that a court of co-ordinate or superior jurisdiction had, in a similar case, addressed and recognised such custom as being a custom binding on people in a particular area; or 2. by proving the existence of such custom by the individual seeking to invoke it as binding upon the class of persons in the same area and in circumstances similar to those under consideration.26 This can be established through expert opinions of people such as tradi- tional rulers, Chiefs or persons who are learned in the custom under consideration. III. Effect of customary law in Nigeria From the on-going socio-political crises in Nigeria, it is somewhat fiddly to determine whether the reintroduction of customary law regime is tantamount to a discovery of a treasure trove or rather Pandora’s box. This inference can be drawn from the current wave of militancy in the Niger Delta, allegedly initiated by groups, such as Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Niger Delta Avengers and Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND)27 on the one hand, and the quest for self-determination or the re-establishment of full application of Sharia law, under the guise of freedom of religion and culture, as demanded by the group referred to as Boko Haram, on the other hand. Customary law was reintroduced with the return of Nigeria to democracy in 1999 after many successive military coups that persisted between 1966 and 1999. The propagation of the demand for rights under the principles of self-determination and/or freedom of religion and culture be- gan. Many businessmen-turned-politicians, particularly those referred to as “money bags”, jumped at the opportunity. And without any political ideology or significant party manifesto, they set their political manoeuvring machine in motion by engaging every means that they believed could secure them the desired seats in government. Accordingly, countless promises, some of which appeared to be either unrealistic or which the promisors may not have the political will to fulfil, were made. The unsuspecting electorates easily believed them. Consequently, the euphoria of the adoption or the acquiescence of the re-establishment of the age-old customary law (including Sharia) after having been suppressed for about three decades re-ignited various other forms of related political agitations and turbulence. Violent protests, armed insurgence, secessionist con- trivance, etc. – all in the name of struggle for political and socio-cultural rights have thus become the order of the day in Nigeria. In practical terms, all of these instigated the creation of the aforementioned movements. Quite clearly, such cataclysmic consequences are not unexpected when unrealistic promises are tossed at unsuspecting electorates by politicians for political gains. 26 See judgement speech of Supreme Court Justice, Andrew Otutu Obaseki JSC, citing section l4 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 62 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (l958) in Prince Bilewu Oyewunmi & Anr v. Amos Owoade Ogunesan (1988) S.C. 26; see also Evidence Act (2011), §§ 16–19 & 73. 27 A group known as Niger Delta Avengers has also joined the list of militant groups and is also now making some unrealistic demands.