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ALJ 2019 Digital Single Market – towards Smart Regulations 43
1. Art. 22 GDPR as an example of an explicit regulation on the use of algorithms
By enacting the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),34 the EU apparently attempted to
restrain algorithmic decisions by means of explicit legal regulation for the first time. In this context,
Art. 22 GDPR, which covers automated individual decision-making, should be highlighted in
particular.35
While the provisions of the GDPR only apply to the processing of personal data,36 this notion is
understood in a broad sense.37 Art. 22 GDPR stipulates that the data subject shall have the right
not to be subject to a decision solely based on automated processing (hereinafter referred to as
an "automated decision") - including profiling38 - which produces legal effects concerning him or
her or similarly significantly affects him or her. Apart from the exceptions to be discussed below,
such decisions (that are made completely automated and without human intervention) are in
principle prohibited. Since the wording of Art. 22 refers to "decisions", these must be distinguished
from automated decision preparations that take place upstream. In this sense, if a person (at best
equipped with decision-making authority and a margin of discretion) examines the decision bases
prepared by an algorithm and then makes the final decision,39 Art. 22 GDPR shall not be
applicable.40 Besides that, it is questionable whether the scope of this clause - in accordance with
its wording - includes trivial algorithms (i.e. simple if-then-decisions). A minimum degree of
complexity should be required in order to be able to speak of an actual automated decision, even
though this assessment might be quite difficult for the individual.41
Art. 22 para. 2 GDPR provides for three exceptions to the general prohibition of exclusively
automated individual decision-making. On the one hand, it is permissible if it is necessary for
34 In force since 25 May 2018.
35 For a detailed analyses of Art 22 GDPR cf. Casey, Farhangi and Vogl, Rethinking Explainable Machines: The GDPR's
'Right to Explanation' Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise, 34 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
143 (2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3143325; Floridi, Soft ethics, the
governance of the digital and the General Data Protection Regulation, 376 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
SOCIETY A (2018), https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2018.0081; Mittelstadt, Allo, Taddeo, Wachter and Floridi, The ethics
of algorithms: Mapping the debate, Big DATA & SOCIETY (2016), available at
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2053951716679679.
36 Cf. Art. 2 No. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR) [2016] OJ L119/1.
37 According to Art. 4 para 1 GDPR, the term “personal data” comprises any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person.
38 “Profiling” means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to
evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects
concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests,
reliability, behavior, location or movements (Art. 4 para 4 GDPR).
39 A pure nod will probably not be sufficient. Cf. Ernst, Algorithmische Entscheidungsfindung und personenbezogene
Daten, 72 JURISTENZEITUNG 1029 (2017); Veale and Edwards, Clarity, surprises, and further questions in Art 29
Working Party draft guidance on automated decision-making and profiling, 34 COMPUTER LAW & SECURITY REVIEW 398
(2018).
40 Consequently, the so-called "scoring" is not covered by Art. 22 GDPR because in this case the decision is only
prepared by a machine, but is ultimately made by a human being.
41 Cf. von Lewinski, Art. 22 GDPR, in BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR DATENSCHUTZRECHT, para 12 seq. (Wolff and Brink
ed., 22nd ed. 2017).
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Buch Austrian Law Journal, Band 1/2019"
Austrian Law Journal
Band 1/2019
- Titel
- Austrian Law Journal
- Band
- 1/2019
- Autor
- Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz
- Herausgeber
- Brigitta Lurger
- Elisabeth Staudegger
- Stefan Storr
- Ort
- Graz
- Datum
- 2019
- Sprache
- deutsch
- Lizenz
- CC BY 4.0
- Abmessungen
- 19.1 x 27.5 cm
- Seiten
- 126
- Schlagwörter
- Recht, Gesetz, Rechtswissenschaft, Jurisprudenz
- Kategorien
- Zeitschriften Austrian Law Journal