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ALJ 2019 Wolfgang Faber/Claes Martinson 98
an unclear question of law. When dealing with unclear questions of law, it is useful to clarify your
course of conduct and mode of thinking.
Step 4: Weigh the different arguments and decide on how to use them by trying to put the decisive and
most important ones together into an argumentation that justifies a solution.
After gathering arguments, as in the third step, the lawyer needs to mould them into an
argumentation. This includes linking those arguments that either support or oppose each other,
and giving priority to some arguments over others according to their relevance and weight. This
process takes place in every legal decision-making.44 There is no particular functional approach
method in this respect. What we need to explain is rather that a functional approach brings the
opportunity to contemplate all of the arguments gathered in the third step. This opportunity makes
the process conscious. It also makes it easier to see the role that property law concepts are playing.
The idea of contemplating all potentially relevant arguments will not be considered strange by
lawyers who are not used to applying a âfunctional approachâ. The ambition should only be that
this process be a conscious one and that the case should not be decided in a simplistic manner, by
mainly relying on concepts such as ownership. This, however, does not mean that concepts are
excluded from the decision-making process altogether. The concepts used in norms need to be
taken account of in the argumentation, if the norm should have normative effect. When used at
this stage in the process, the real problem has, however, been allowed to have an important effect
on how the problem is perceived, and thereby it also affects the understanding of the concept. The
concept used in the norm is a tool to communicate the typical interest of a typical party and the
norm needs still to be understood relationally and relatively.
Finally, there are some general things that can be said about the weighing process that is to be
conducted at the fourth step. Firstly, the normative propositions such as statutes and precedent
are of course attributed high normative value. However, when it comes to so called hard or unclear
questions of law, such as in the Banco Santander case, the norms often do not address the real
problem in a direct way. The process of âinterpretationâ of the norms becomes difficult. Secondly,
to include the other types of arguments, such as assumptions regarding the consequences a legal
decision concerning the real problem can have, is a common part of the legal decision-making
process, though a lawyerâs consciousness of doing so may vary considerably. Assumptions like this
do affect the legal thinking, as well as the understanding of a normative dictum, such as an act of
parliament. A norm cannot be understood without an idea of what the reality the norm should
govern looks like. When we, for example, try to learn a rule on the buyerâs priority over the sellerâs
creditors, we do not comprehend it until we understand that these rules (also) govern the risk of
fraudulent behaviour by the parties. We therefore make assumptions on the level of risk or are
told about such assumptions that other lawyers have already made. In the same way, a norm
cannot be understood without values. A common value is that law should treat everyone equally
and to fully understand a rule on the buyerâs priority over the sellerâs creditors, we might need to
see whether or not the rule can easily be circumvented.
44 It is well known that there are various ways of explaining how legal argumentation is constructed and how legal
decisions are made. This is a common topic in legal theory. A common simplified explanation is that it is a matter
of âinterpretingâ the law. For a classical attempt to explain legal methodology, see, for instance, RUDOLF VON JHERING,
GEIST DES RĂMISCHEN RECHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN SEINER ENTWICKLUNG, PART II/2 322â445 (1st ed., 1858).
zurĂŒck zum
Buch Austrian Law Journal, Band 1/2019"
Austrian Law Journal
Band 1/2019
- Titel
- Austrian Law Journal
- Band
- 1/2019
- Autor
- Karl-Franzens-UniversitÀt Graz
- Herausgeber
- Brigitta Lurger
- Elisabeth Staudegger
- Stefan Storr
- Ort
- Graz
- Datum
- 2019
- Sprache
- deutsch
- Lizenz
- CC BY 4.0
- Abmessungen
- 19.1 x 27.5 cm
- Seiten
- 126
- Schlagwörter
- Recht, Gesetz, Rechtswissenschaft, Jurisprudenz
- Kategorien
- Zeitschriften Austrian Law Journal