Seite - 155 - in Austrian Law Journal, Band 2/2018

ALJ 2018 European Monetary Fund 155 constitute an instrument for the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States […]’ (Emphasis added).91 In summary, the establishment of the EMF seems to be a case of Treaty amendment and not Treaty supplementation, for which Article 48 TEU would be the appropriate legal base and not Article 352 TFEU. f. Conclusion In conclusion, it appears highly questionable whether Article 352 TFEU can be invoked as a legal basis for integrating the ESM into the EU legal framework. Yet not only issues of competence pervade the proposal. Even if the Commission nonetheless decides to go ahead with its proposal, it will encounter further problems as outlined in the next section. C. The Wider Implications of Integrating the ESM into the EU Legal Framework 1. More Democratic? Accountability Towards the European Parliament One of the guiding principles of the Commission’s reform proposals was to strengthen democratic accountability: ‘Completing EMU also means greater political responsibility and transparency about who decides what and when at the different levels. This requires bringing the European dimension of decision- making closer to citizens and more to the forefront of national debates and making sure that both national parliaments and the European Parliament have sufficient powers of oversight’.92 Hence, it comes as no surprise that the draft Regulation on the establishment of the EMF seeks to make the EMF accountable to the European Parliament. For instance, Article 5 of the draft Regulation provides that the EMF shall submit annual reports on the execution of its tasks and respond to oral and written questions put to it by the European Parliament. There are, however, ‘two difficulties with such an accountability scheme. First, these are only reporting obligations and do not allow Parliament any influence in the actual decision-making of the EMF. Second, the European Parliament may not be an adequate forum for EMF accountability purposes in the first place. Members of the EMF are only euro area Members, but in the European Parliament all EU Member States are represented, not only those that have adopted the euro. The EMF is thus made accountable to an institution with a different composition than the Members that provide for its capital’.93 Whether the proposal really contributes to making EMU more democratic is thus questionable. 2. More Efficient? The New Decision-Making Procedure Another important objective of the Commission’s proposal was to make the EMF more efficient by speeding-up the decision making process. For this purpose, the draft introduces the concept of a reinforced qualified majority. It requires 85% of the votes cast,94 whereby the voting rights of each 91 Case C-370/12, supra note 71, para. 110-111. 92 COM (2017) 827 final, supra note 6, at 3. 93 See Ioannidis, supra note 53. 94 See Articles 4(2) and (4) of the Draft Statute of the EMF, supra note 55, at 3.