Seite - 51 - in Book of Full Papers - Symposium Hydro Engineering

threats, risks, and potential response actions for a dam safety emergency compared to a wildfire emergency. DWR Executives, Oroville ICT, CalFire, and the Butte County Sheriff met as a team to address situational awareness, identify critical next steps, and lay out a short process to form a Unified Command Team. The Unified Command Team formed between DWR, CalFire, and the Butte County Sheriff was critical to quickly address the chain of command at the local level, reinforcement of the ICT with strong SEMS processes, procedures and roles, and improve internal and external communication with other EOCs, the media, and the public. Another critical component of the Emergency Management Team was the regulators responsible for overseeing dam owners and the safety of dams. Oroville Dam is regulated by two entities: the State of California Department of Water Resources’ Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In California, the DSOD takes a prominent role in the regulation and oversight of dams that fall under their jurisdiction. DSOD regulates about 1,250 dams in California and makes regular inspections, construction inspections, and dam re-evaluations. FERC regulates dams associated with the generation of hydroelectric power that are issued a license under their jurisdiction. FERC regulates these dams to assist the licensee in ensuring and promoting dam safety and following Federal dam safety requirements as well as general compliance with license requirements. FERC regulates approximately 2,500 dams throughout the United States and performs regular dam safety inspections, reviews and approves of any new construction or modifications to existing dams, performs construction inspections, and often requires independent consultant reviews of high and significant hazard projects. State and Federal laws mandate that both the FERC and DSOD play an independent role in dam safety, including during emergency responses such as Oroville. During the emergency, both DSOD and FERC were available on-site 24/7. They participated in briefings, meetings, technical evaluations and other activities to be fully informed of threats, risks and proposed mitigation measures. Many DWR decisions to address the emergency required the regulators to be aware of, consulted with or approve. The regulators maintained authority to allow or disallow proposed actions resulting from those decisions. Even though the regulators were cooperative and collaborative during the emergency, they maintained a high level of independent oversight of DWR. Transparency offered by the DWR and the availability of the regulators allowed the response and recovery process to proceed in an expeditious manner. The regulators therefore played a critical role in the emergency response.. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) was also added to the Unified Command Team for their expertise in emergency dam repairs and support for decisions on reservoir operations. Their expertise in the development of response alternatives, risk assessments, technical capabilities, and implementation of mitigation measures was critical to the emergency response. The Unified Command Team proved very effective in addressing response conflicts, improving communication to the media and the public, setting global priorities, and maintaining safety and security. Daily briefings and in-person meetings and frequent telephone conferences were held to ensure that the Unified Command Team maintained common response objectives, threats to the infrastructure, personnel and 51