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COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE DES GRANDS BARRAGES ------- VINGT-SIXIÈME CONGRÈS DES GRANDS BARRAGES Autriche, juillet 2018 ------- OPERATIONAL MODES MONITORING FOR PREVENTION OF FAILURE OF DAMS WITHIN THE DESIGN ENVELOPE DND HARTFORD and SJ RIGBEY. Dam Safety, BC HYDRO CANADA 1. INTRODUCTION For the purpose of promoting debate and discussion this paper introduces two important and difficult questions concerning surveillance and monitoring arise for dam owners that pursue or are interested in pursuing risk-informed dam safety management. The questions, in no particular order because they are related are: 1. To what extent should dam owners rely on risk assessment to guide their surveillance activities? and, 2. Which approach to risk assessment should they use? Everyone involved in dam safety management is involved in risk management to some degree. This is regardless of whether or not some type of risk assessment is practiced in their country or if they favour risk assessment over established deterministic practices. Further, and again regardless of the approach (deterministic or probabilistic), all dam safety management activities depend to a significant degree on reliable monitoring data and surveillance reports for their integrity. The data and surveillance reports reflect the performance of the dam in its operational mode, where the operational mode refers to any condition of combination of the conditions of containment of the stored volume and passage of flows through and around the dam that the dam has experienced or is intended to experience during its operating life. This definition of operational mode corresponds to that used in the nuclear and other industries [1]. The operational modes of the dam as a whole are derived from the operational modes of its subsystems, components and parts and the activities, or 1552