Seite - 110 - in Critical Issues in Science, Technology and Society Studies - Conference Proceedings of the 17th STS Conference Graz 2018

mosquito species transmitting malaria. • Due to cross-fertilization between different mosquito species it could be possible that an efficient suppression drive jumps over to another non-target mosquito species. • Ecological consequences (including cascading effects within the food chain) could be the unintended result of the use of gene drives. (David et al 2013) It is scientifically irrefutably clarified that malaria mosquitoes have only a damaging function in nature by infecting humans? Do they have instead also important beneficial and indispensable roles in the food chain or in the pollination business? For mosquitoes, in general, there are examples showing that (Camargue, Nordic Artic, aquatic systems), but mainly we have to admit ignorance about that. One could believe that manipulation drives finally aiming at the transmitting behaviour of the parasite might be more intelligent and less risky. But again unintended off-target effects are possible. And it could turn out that very quick processes of natural evolution in the parasite-host relation destroy initial successes or make the parasite´s impact for humans even worse. This would probably provoke engineering and use of more and more gene drives trying to resolve renewed emerging problems again and again. In sum, several risks and unintended consequences of gene drives can be anticipated in all clarity. But, there are also plenty of uncertainties and unknowns due to the dynamic complexity of natural systems. Fundamental problems and questions Beyond the risks sketched above several much more fundamental problems and questions emerge: • If there is a chance that a gene drive can be made evolutionary stable in a natural environment, then already a single release of a modified organism with wrong or detrimental characteristics (even unknown before) could have irreversible consequences. There is not something like a tolerable limited release. • A dual-use potential seems to be obvious. • By realizing mutagenic chain reactions the already high depth of intervention by humankind into natural processes would be massively increased. That is per se a risky undertaking, since irreversible unintended changes could be the result. Also intended effects could be problematic. • The intrinsic logic of gene drives fighting malaria suggests already that after first attempts more and more gene drives have to be engineered and released to correct or improve what wasn´t achievable in the first step? One gene drive will not suffice, the pressure for more will “naturally” be generated to bring about human control – which could turn out as being unachievable in the end? Do we have to expect a chain reaction of mutagenic chain reactions, prone to human error and ignorance? • Engineering gene drives to fight malaria (and the fight against malaria is definitely justified and indisputable) could turn out as a welcomed door-opener for much more. What is already on the horizon? (NAS 2016) Surely, gene drives against other mosquitoes, in general against other insects or rodents transmitting infectious diseases. Probably gene 110