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62 L. SCHLOGL AND A. SUMNER
is cheaper than in high-income countries, thus more competitive vis-
Ă -vis machines, and there is thus less of an incentive to automate; and
(ii) conversely, given widespread low-skilled manual routine work, work
tasks that are prevalent in developing countries are easier to automate
from a technological viewpoint. In other words, the APS will likely be
larger in developing countries. Considering the taxonomy that was pro-
posed earlier, this means that automation is arguably more technologi-
cally but less economically feasible.
Empirical estimates and forecasts of the potential impact of auto-
mation across the world are presented in Table 5.2 (the table is non-
exhaustive). It is immediately evident from the studies in Table 5.2 that
there is no consensus on jobs impacts and substantial variation in current
estimates.
Estimates range from alarming scenarios, according to which there is
a “50% chance of AI outperforming humans in all tasks within 45 years”
(Grace, Salvatier, Dafoe, Zhang, & Evans, 2017, emphasis added), on
the one hand, to contrasting claims of there being “no evidence that
automation leads to joblessness” (Mishel & Bivens, 2017, p. 1), and the
sarcastic recommendation that “everyone should take a deep breath”
(Atkinson & Wu, 2017, p. 23).
The seminal study in the recent automation literature is that of Frey
and Osborne (2013) for the United States, and subsequent studies have
reproduced and refined their methodology. They conclude that almost
half of the US employment is “at risk.” In contrast, Arntz, Gregory, and
Zierahn (2016) occupies a middle ground in terms of optimism. The
authors argue with some plausibility for a “task-based” rather than an—
inevitably oversimplified—“occupation-based” approach to estimating
automatability risk. Arntz et al. draw on data from an international sur-
vey of adult skills conducted across OECD countries which contains data
Table 5.1 The labor dynamics of automation in a dual economy
Source Authors’ imagination
Technology Labor Response Outcome
Complementary Adapted Keep/hire Structural stability
Substitutive Adaptable Retrain/switch task Structural change
Lower wage
Non-adaptable Lay off
Disrupted Development and the Future of Inequality in the Age of Automation