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ALJ 1/2015 Authoritarian Liberalism 71 pean Parliament.30 The various processes precipitated in the context of the European Semester basically involve national governments and supranational executive institutions. For example, members of the Euro Zone have to submit annually to the Commission and the Eu- rogroup a draft budgetary plan for the upcoming year. The Commission is to issue an opinion on this draft.31 Only at the request of the Member State’s parliament has the Commission also to pre- sent its opinion to the national parliament.32 Nonetheless, this opinion is important, for it provides a basis for discussion within the Eurogroup.33 Matters appear to be even more aggravated in the context of “enhanced surveillance” in which Member States, even if they are not subject to a bailout,34 have to report to the European Central Bank and carry out various stress tests at its re- quest.35 What is more, a Member State concerned has to introduce mechanisms of closer monitor- ing of its financial situation and to submit quarterly reports.36 The transfer of authority over policy-making from the domestic to the supranational level becomes more pronounced once a Member State has become subject to the excessive deficit procedure. The Member State is then under an obligation to present an “economic partnership program”,37 which is supposed “to identify and select a number of specific priorities aiming to enhance competitive- ness and long-term sustainable growth and addressing structural weaknesses in the Member State concerned”.38 Unsurprisingly, these priorities are expected to be “consistent with the Union’s strat- egy for growth and jobs.”39 Second, the refinancing of sovereign debt through the ESM is negotiated with the troika, among which the European Commission plays a most important role.40 The terms of conditions of actual Memoranda of Understanding seem to be consistent with the mindset of the Washington consen- sus. They are likely to include the privatization of public services or to address certain “rigidities” of labour law or wage formation.41 In the case of Greece the package of conditions seems to amount even to a program for reinventing the Greek state.42 Since the Commission has over the years put greater emphasis on restoring external balance through internal devaluation (rather than reducing debt), employment relationships and employability through lower wages or lower employment costs have become a focus of concern.43 In can be observed, in this context, that the conditionality 30 See, Menendez, note 17 at 138; Hallerberg et al, note 21 at 5. 31 See Article 6(1) and 7(1) of Regulation 473/2013. 32 See Article 7(3) of Regulation 473/2013. 33 See Article (5) of Regulation 473/2013. 34 The Commission has discretion to submit a Member State to enhanced surveillance if that Member State experi- ences or is threatened with experiencing “serious difficulties with respect to its financial stability which are likely to have adverse spill-over effects on other Member States in the euro area.” Article 2(1) Regulation 472/2013. 35 See Article 3(3)(a) and (b) Regulation 472/2013. 36 See Article 10(2) and (3) Regulation 473/2013. Generally, such closer monitoring is supposed to be facilitated domestically through the introduction of independent bodies. See Article 5 of Regulation 473/2013. 37 See Article 9(1) of Regulation 473/2013. 38 Article 9(2) of Regulation 473/2013. 39 Ibid. 40 See Scharpf, note 12 at 12. 41 For a description, see Tsoukala, note 19 at 57–65. Article 7(1)(4) explicitly states that adjustment programs “shall take into account the practice and institutions of wage formation and the national reform programme of the Member State concerned in the context of the Union’s strategy for growth and jobs.” This can mean that the memorandum either is supposed to respect them or to address the problems that they pose in the context of the strategy for growth and jobs. 42 See Philomila Tsoukala, Narratives of the European Crisis and the Future of Social Europe, 48 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 241, 259 et seqq (2013). 43 See Scharpf, note 12 at 12; Tsoukala, note 19 at 61–65.