Page - 84 - in Austrian Law Journal, Volume 1/2015

ALJ 1/2015 Alexander Somek 84 XII. Executive summary (as it behoves the topic) The analytical exercise is therewith completed. We have explored the close relationship between authority and delegations. The authority of a delegate becomes authoritarian if the delegate delegates on behalf of the delegator. The reason for a judgement substitution is a perceived incapacity on the part of the delegator to realise that delegation is rationally warranted. The two mechanisms for the reversal of authorisation are the modal openness of trust and the trust trap. They move a relationship into an authoritarian direction, which indicates a lack of democratic control and contestation. Authoritarian rule claims to be legitimate. It is supposed to be good for those who are subject to it. But since they, by definition, can neither assess the circumstances of rational delegation nor understand why they are better off on account of the delegate, they need to obey blindly. They have to be gullible. Of course, their gullibility is supposed to pay a dividend.104 The delegate may therefore rightly expect them to trust cognitively and to adjust their behaviour to whatever the delegate regards as an exercise of his power. It may be objected that the authoritarianism sketched here appears to be far too epistemic in its orientation and too benign in practice. Where are outright acts of oppression? Where is discrimi- nation against minorities or the use of political justice105 in order to take care of political oppo- nents? Without a doubt, these become part of authoritarian rule if people do not sheepishly suc- cumb to the supposition that they are too dim-witted to decide whom to obey and for what rea- son. Authoritarianism begins to look ugly when confronted with an unruly people. Nevertheless, repression is not one of its necessary components. If folks are sufficiently trusting, authoritarian rule can come with a much more friendly face. Think of Singapore. Authoritarian liberalism represents a commitment to the administration of free markets. It refuses to have delegations deconstructed in processes of public contestation and votes. Institutionally, it is visible in the constitutional entrenchment of economic liberties vis-à-vis legislatures or trade unions and in institutions that shift control of economic or monetary governance from the people to expert bodies and to the executive branch. Authoritarian liberalism is, however, ambivalent. If the emphasis rests on economic liberalism then authoritarian modes of policy definition and policy implementation are subservient to— using old-fashioned parlance—the interests of private property. If, by contrast, the authoritarian realisation of a founding mission is at stake, economic liberalism may be a means of mitigating its impact by making it more palatable to the pursuit of the individual self-interest. XIII. Liberal and authoritarian authoritarian liberalism In the case of the European Union, the identifications of elements of authoritarian liberalism can be left to the discerning power of judgement. It is submitted here, however, that the European Union owes its appeal in no small part to the ambivalence of authoritarian liberalism. Authoritar- ianism reinforces economic liberalism, which itself reinforces the authoritarian construction of 104 See my Accidental Cosmopolitanism, 4 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY, 2012, at 371. 105 See OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS (Princeton University Press, 1969).