Page - 46 - in Austrian Law Journal, Volume 1/2017

ALJ 1/2017 Lambert H.B. Asemota 46 It is however imperative to note that while MEND (in the southern part of Nigeria) and related groups allegedly embraced the amnesty that was granted them by the federal government (albeit partially28), the Boko Haram movement (in northern Nigeria) has so far turned down such offer. Instead, the latter is alleged to have developed into a terrorist group.29 It has been generally argued that MEND and some other similar movements tended to have legitimate aim in demanding a share of the natural resources found on their land. This inference is usually drawn mainly from two persuasive grounds: 1. the principle of fiscal federalism, as Nigeria operates a federal system;30 and 2. the contents of the “Independence Constitution” of 196031 and those of the “Republican Constitution” of 196332. While arguments for or against the former ground could be characterised by a range of insinua- tions, it appears that inference in the affirmative can be drawn from the latter. For instance, the constitutional provisions on the distribution of mining royalties and rent in sections 134 to 139 of the 1960 Constitution stipulate that every Region (now State) is entitled to fifty percent (50 %) of the proceeds of any mineral extraction activities (particularly mineral oil) derived by the Federa- tion from that Region. Additionally, thirty percent (30 %) from the royalties and rent is to be credited to Distributable Pool Account. And fractions of whatever amount standing to the credit of the Distributable Pool Account shall, at every quarter, be disbursed to the Regions in specified per- centage.33 However, the 1963 Constitution34 is slightly different from the 1960 Independence Constitution in this regard: while under the former, the mining royalties and rent and related matters are con- tained in sections 140 to 145, the latter provides for same under sections 134 to 139. They practi- cally say the same thing. Both Constitutions are however silent on the issue of the remainder twenty percent (20 %). It appears by implication that that was the percentage to which the federal government was originally entitled in the share of the federal allocation. Another major change brought by the 1963 Constitution worth mentioning is the abolition of the position of the Queen of England as the Head of State represented by a Governor-General, thereby replacing it with the 28 “Partially”, because factions of the various movements (they are many) often raise concerns that some of their members have secretly accepted gratifications from the government and their agents and have made decisions that are not in the interests of the generality of the groups. These fractions therefore warn that any agreements reached with such select individuals do not represent the resolution of the movement as a body. 29 See U.S. Department of State, Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru, STATE.GOV (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/266565.htm; see also BBC Africa, Nigeria: US ‘to name Boko Haram as a terrorist group’ (Nov. 13,2013), BBC.COM, online http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24922833accessed (last visited Mar. 27, 2017). 30 In Alex O. Atawa Akpodiete, What Exactly is True Federalism & SONACO, THE NIGERIAN VOICE (Apr. 17, 2012, 21:28 CET), http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/87726/1/what-exactly-is-true-federalism-sonaco.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2017), he writes that Federalism is “a system of government in which the individual states within a country have con- trol over their own affairs, but are controlled by a central government for national decision. A republic, on the other hand is defined by the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary as a country that is governed by a president and politi- cians elected by the people and where there is no king or queen.” He further emphasises that, “that means that the Federal Republic of Nigeria is supposed to be a country (...) ruled by a president and elected politicians, but each state should have autonomy and only controlled by Abuja for national decisions.” 31 Constitution of Nigeria (1960), §§ 134–139, which is regarded as independence constitution, available at http://www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/1960-1999ConstitutionofNigeria.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2017). 32 Constitution of Nigeria (1963), §§ 140–145, available at http://www.lawnigeria.com/CONSTITUTIONHUB/Constitution/ 1963ConstitutionofNigeria.html (last visited Mar. 27,2017). 33 See Constitution of Nigeria (1960), §§ 134–139. 34 See Constitution of Nigeria (1963), §§ 140–145.