Page - 46 - in Austrian Law Journal, Volume 1/2019

ALJ 2019 Peter Egger et al 46 by "software agents"59) raises the question whether these could - albeit autonomously - collude in order to achieve higher selling prices and thus cause a (banned) "concerted practice" within the meaning of Art. 101 para. 1 TFEU.60 Corresponding academic discussions focus on the imputability of autonomous behaviour.61 Although the factual elements of Art. 101 para. 1 TFEU are interpreted widely by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in its case-law,62 it should be noted that the Commission’s sanctioning decision for an infringement of Art. 101 TFEU is similar in character to a decision under criminal law63 and presupposes an element of guilt64 which cannot be found in algorithmic decision-making. However, if an undertaking uses AI to determine prices, it seems possible to interpret the aspect of imputation in the context of competition law in a functional sense (which is by no means unfamiliar to European competition law) accompanied with a refutable presumption of knowledge.65 Thus, Art. 101 para. 1 TFEU is an example of existing legislation that – although not explicitly addressing the use of algorithms – seems perfectly fit to deal with the challenges of autonomous algorithmic decision-making. III. Is the European product liability law smart enough to deal with AI? The example of Art. 101 TFEU has already shown that questions with regard to digitisation can be answered by applying legislation that predates the digital revolution. Another example of such legislation is product liability law. Recent technological advances lead to a range of new products, the functionality of which is substantially based on the use of software. Due to the use of software, products can be modified after purchase by “updating” them. Tesla, for example, already sells cars able to update themselves without human intervention. From a legal perspective, the question arises who is responsible for an update that is carried out without human intervention. This 59 Cf. in that context Keßler, Intelligente Roboter: neue Technologien im Einsatz, 20 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 589 (2017). 60 Cf. also OECD (DAF/COMP, 2017) 4 para 75 et seq.; Ebers, Dynamic Algorithmic Pricing: Abgestimmte Verhaltensweise oder rechtmäßiges Parallelverhalten?, 4 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KARTELLRECHT 555 (2016); Ritz and Marx, Algorithmen im Fokus der Monopolkommission: Digital Antitrust erfordert Anpassungen kartellrechtlicher Compliance, 10 PRAXIS IM IMMATERIALGÜTER- UND WETTBEWERBSRECHT 422 (2018); Salaschek/Serafimova, Preissetzungsalgorithmen im Lichte von Art 101 AEUV, 63 WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 12 (2018); Ylinen, Digital Pricing und Kartellrecht, 6 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KARTELLRECHT 21 (2018); the latter text with reference to the fact that an autonomous abuse of market power within the meaning of Art 102 TFEU triggered by AI is possible, too. Furthermore cf. Louven, Antitrust by Design – Kartellrechtliche Technik-Compliance für Algorithmen, Blockchain und Plattformen?, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INNOVATIONS- UND TECHNIKRECHT 176 (2018) (the English version of this article is available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259142 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3259142); Ezrachi and Stucke, Artificial Intelligence and collusion: when computers inhibit competition, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 1782 (2017). 61 Cf. also OECD (DAF/COMP, 2017) 4 paras 79, 100 seq.; Ezrachi and Stucke, supra note 60, at 1801. 62 Cf. more recently on the use of booking software for travel agencies Case C-74/14 Eturas UAB and Others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42. 63 Cf. Case C-17/10 Toshiba Corporation and Others v Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže, ECLI:EU:C:2012:72, Opinion of AG Kokott (ECLI:EU:C:2011:552), paras 48, 101; Kokott, Zum Irrtum eines Unternehmens über die Kartellrechtswidrigkeit seines Verhaltens, 1 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KARTELLRECHT 148 (2013). 64 Cf. Art. 23 para. 2 a). of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2002] OJ L1/1. 65 Cf. also to the questions of imputability Salaschek and Serafimova, supra note 60, at 14 seq. Of course, the presumption of innocence (for antitrust law cf. Case C-74/14, supra note 62, at para 38) needs to be taken into account as well.