Page - 58 - in Austrian Law Journal, Volume 2/2017

ALJ 2/2017 Philipp Anzenberger / Tjaša Ivanc 58 represent an indispensable tool for preventing the transfer or withdrawal of funds held by the debtor (especially in a bank account). Without such measures, the subsequent enforcement of the creditor’s claim against the debtor in many cases becomes substantially more difficult – even more so if the debtors’ funds are located in a different Member State.3 In recent years, however, the European legislator has taken important steps to overcome these shortcomings. The recast of the Brussels I Regulation4 (now called Brussels Ia Regulation;5 applicable since 10 January 2015) not only enlarges the bandwidth of enforceable national interim measures (even ex parte measures can now be enforced under certain circumstances)6 but also facilitates the actual enforcement by abolishing the exequatur procedure.7 On the other hand, the entirely new European Account Preservation Order Regulation8 establishes a genuine European procedure for creating provisional measures enabling the creditor to obtain a European account preservation order and preventing the withdrawal or transfer of funds held by the debtor in a bank account in a Member State.9 This new Regulation became effective on 18 January 2017 (Art. 54 EAPO Regulation).10 This paper provides a comparative analysis of these two new and rather distinct instruments for European creditors. Thereby it evaluates the rules on preconditions, legal remedies and the different effects of national interim measures that shall be recognised and enforced within the Brussels Ia regime and the new EAPO. The paper mainly seeks to answer the following questions: a) How do the two Regulations differ in scope regarding provisional account preservation measures? b) To what extent do the new Regulations provide a surprise effect concerning the preserva- tion of bank accounts? c) What are the differences in effect between a European Account Preservation Order and an interim measure to be enforced according to the Brussels Ia Regulation? Domej, Internationale Zwangsvollstreckung zwischen Territorialitätsprinzip, Gläubigerinteressen und Schuldnerschutz, in DIE ANERKENNUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHT – EUROPÄISCHES VOLLSTRECKUNGSRECHT 109, 110–115 (Burkhard Hess ed., 2014); Claudia Reith, Wissenswertes zur Europäischen Kontenpfändungsverordnung, 2016 ECOLEX 780, 780. 3 Nils Harbeck, Ein Entwurf! Zum Vorschlag einer Europäischen Verordnung zur vorläufigen Kontenpfändung in grenz- überschreitenden Verfahren, 15 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE INSOLVENZRECHT 805, 805 (2012); Hubertus Schumacher & Barbara Köllensperger, Die „Europäische Kontenpfändung“ und der Schutz des Unternehmens – Gibt es noch Anpas- sungsbedarf am Weg zum „fair trial“? 136 JURISTISCHE BLÄTTER 413, 413 (2014). 4 Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judg- ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1. 5 Regulation 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1. 6 Reinhold Geimer, Das Anerkennungsregime der neuen Brüssel I-Verordnung (EU) Nr 1215/2012, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELLWIG TORGGLER 311, 328 (Hanns Fitz et al. eds., 2013). 7 REINHOLD GEIMER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT ¶ 3174b–3174e (7th ed. 2015). 8 Regulation 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order Procedure to Facilitate Cross-Border Debt Recovery in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2014 O.J. (L 189) 59. 9 Tanja Domej, Das Rechtsbehelfsverfahren bei der europäischen vorläufigen Kontenpfändung, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR DAPHNE- ARIANE SIMOTTA 129, 129 (Reinhold Geimer et al. eds., 2012); Nunner-Krautgasser, supra note 2, at 133; Reith, supra note 2, at 781. 10 The economic analysis of the EAPO Regulation shows that the introduction of this instrument will encourage the full use of the EU internal market, debtors’ solvency, and recovery of debts. On the other hand, unjustified orders will create a number of harmful externalities to creditors, national authorities, and financial institutions; cf. Nicolas Kyriakides, An Economic Analysis of the European Commission's Proposal for a European Account Preservation Order (2013), available at http://www.virtusinterpress.org/IMG/pdf/10-22495_rgcv3i4art5.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2017).