Page - (000619) - in Autonomes Fahren - Technische, rechtliche und gesellschaftliche Aspekte

Regulation and the Risk of Inaction598 avenue for that recovery, however, is litigation, product liability law may be forced to bend in ways that distort its regulatory function. While an expansion of insurance has merit as a standalone initiative, it must be a condi- tion of any reasonable proposal to subsidize vehicle automation by limiting tort remedies. Reducing a defendant’s liability means reducing an injured individual’s access to compen- sation. It also means depriving that individual of a sanctioned means of recourse: Suing a manufacturer, whatever its inefficiencies, is still preferable to sabotaging that company’s products or undertaking other means of private retribution. 27.2.2 Facilitate Private Insurance While private insurers can also provide compensation, their potential role as regulators is particularly promising. A well-functioning insurance market can generate useful data and desirable incentives. It can reduce uncertainty for those who might be plaintiffs as well as for those who are regularly defendants. Take two distinct examples: vehicle insurance and product liability insurance. In the United States, most drivers and vehicle owners are required to carry insurance for harms inflicted with their vehicles. The required coverage varies by state and is generally far less than would be necessary to compensate for a serious injury or death; California, for example, requires only $15,000 in coverage for injury or death to one person and $30,000 in coverage for injury or death to more than one person [4]. The companies that offer this insurance tend to be subject to complex regulatory regimes that also vary by state; California even prescribes the primary factors to be used in pricing such insurance [5]. An alternative regime could respond much more flexibly to vehicle automation. Increas- ing and then enforcing insurance requirements could help internalize more crash costs, compensate injury more fully, shift some recovery from manufacturers toward negligent drivers, and enable consolidation of some product liability claims through subrogation. Reducing consumer-facing restrictions on insurers could free these companies to better tailor their products to reflect the actual risk posed by particular drivers in particular vehi- cles in particular conditions. This could in turn advantage those automated vehicles that actually represent a safety improvement. In contrast to drivers, companies are generally not required by law to maintain product liability insurance. Indeed, one of the purposes of the corporate form is to protect share- holders from liability. Requiring such coverage, however, could provide a check on safety by engaging a third-party insurer in a regulatory role: In order to obtain affordable coverage – or coverage at all – a manufacturer would need to persuade the insurer that its products do not pose unreasonable risk. This would be another way to “delegate the safety case,” to quote the section of the same name below. The regimes created by Nevada and California to regulate automated vehicles already require companies seeking to test their systems on public roads to demonstrate financial capacity beyond typical state insurance requirements. California, for example, requires