Page - (000623) - in Autonomes Fahren - Technische, rechtliche und gesellschaftliche Aspekte

Regulation and the Risk of Inaction602 federal regime offers through self-certification to specific standards is diminished by the recalls and lawsuits that can arise years or even decades after a vehicle has been sold. Indeed, unlike current federal motor vehicle safety standards, a safety case could con- template the entire product lifecycle. A developer might describe not only the steps it had taken to ensure reasonable safety at the time of sale but also the steps it would continue to take as it learned more about performance in the field. 27.4 Simplify the Problem 27.4.1 Limit the Duration of Risk The potential longevity of any motor vehicle – the “average” age of cars in the United States is more than eleven years [15] – can create uncertainty for its manufacturers [21] and safety concerns for the public [26]. In 2013, Chrysler reluctantly recalled some Jeeps that were twenty years old [9], [13]. More generally, newer vehicles tend to be safer than older vehicles; “improvements made after the model year 2000 fleet prevented the crashes of 700,000 vehicles; prevented or mitigated the injuries of 1 million occupants; and saved 2,000 lives in the 2008 calendar year alone” [8]. This uncertainty may be particularly great in the case of automated vehicles [21]. Even extensive testing may not capture the full range of scenarios that these vehicles could face. Manufacturers may have difficulty predicting “the eventual response of judges, juries, regulators, consumers, and the public at large to incidents that will inevitably occur” [28]. Regulators may be “concerned that, first, isolated incidents involving these products will create feelings of helplessness and panic that unjustifiably stymie their wider adoption and that, second, these early products will still be around years later when they are much less safe than whatever has become state of the art” [26]. A promising response to these challenges is a lifecycle approach to vehicle design that seeks to limit the duration of risk. For the private sector, this could entail over-the-air up- dates, end-user license agreements, leasing arrangements, and a variety of other technical and legal tools to enable manufacturers to update or even forcibly retire systems in which they no longer have confidence [21]. For the public sector, this could mean requiring com- panies to document a strategy and a capacity for monitoring the long-term safety of their systems. Such documentation could be a key part of the safety case introduced above. 27.4.2 Exclude the Extreme The aphorism that “the perfect is the enemy of the good” [33] is instructive for vehicle automation. Demanding perfection may impede the development or deployment of systems that, while not perfect, nonetheless represent a significant improvement over conventional vehicles. Excessive design demands, for example, might preclude an automated vehicle