Page - (000627) - in Autonomes Fahren - Technische, rechtliche und gesellschaftliche Aspekte

Regulation and the Risk of Inaction606 driving imposes environmental costs that are not internalized by vehicle owners and operators [18]. If automated driving proves to be more fuel efficient than human driving, a higher fuel tax would also incentivize automation. In short, reform should seek to more closely align what is lawful with what is reasonable and to more closely align actual driver behavior with both [20]. The expectation that both automated vehicles and human drivers should behave reasonably is itself reasonable and ultimately advantageous to automated driving. 27.5.2 Embrace Enterprise Liability Although vehicle automation will change the way some cases are litigated and resolved, manufacturers are likely to continue to successfully manage their product liability [28]. Uncertainty about liability is probably more of an impediment to product deployment than actual exposure to liability – and there are strategies that companies can take to manage that uncertainty [21]. This confidence, however, is not universal [11]. A more skeptical view even has prece- dent: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 was passed in response to similar concerns that traditional product liability had rendered some vaccines uneconomic for their would-be producers. The regime it created “combines procedural and substantive limita- tions on conventional tort remedies with an alternative compensation scheme for probable victims of covered vaccines” [21]. If product liability exposure does impede the deployment of automated vehicles, a sim- ilar regime might be an effective response. However, that is by no means the only conceiv- able alternative. Rather than limiting liability for the manufacturers of automated systems, courts or legislatures could expand liability for everyone else. This is counterintuitive and, as a leg- islative proposal, unlikely to go anywhere. Nonetheless, consider the consequences of introducing a system of enterprise liability in which manufacturers are liable for all harm associated with their products. In other words, what would be different if automakers could be successfully sued for every crash involving their product rather than just the small fraction in which a vehicle defect contributed to the injury? Some effects would be undesirable. Automakers might outright refuse to sell their vehicles in any jurisdiction with enterprise liability. Others would demand higher prices to cover their increased costs. This could in turn mean less access for consumers, particularly those with limited resources. Other effects, however, might arguably be more desirable. No longer would dealers simply hand over car keys to new buyers. Instead, manufacturers might require these buy- ers to complete more thorough driver training customized for the particular vehicle. Tech- nologies like alcohol-sensing ignition locks and speed regulators might become standard. Older vehicles might be promptly removed from roads as safer systems are introduced. A notable result could be safer roads.