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4 TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION 43
repetitive, dangerous, unhealthy tasks, and so improve both the quality of
work and of products and come with public health benefits. Importantly,
automation decreases the cost of production and should thus, in a com-
petitive market, lead to lower prices which benefit all consumers. Not
only this, but “automation, by reducing wages relative to the rental rate
of capital, encourages the creation of new labor-intensive tasks and gen-
erates a powerful self-correcting force towards stability” (Acemoglu &
Restrepo, 2015, p. 41). Optimists tend to suggest skills development for
the labor force to allow a synergetic relationship of human and nonhu-
man work. This is in keeping with Goldin and Katz’ (2007) race between
technology and skill supply itself drawing on the Tinbergen (1974, 1975)
thesis. Further, they might advocate to reduce taxes on labor which
would make labor relatively more competitive vis-Ă -vis robots.
The pessimists’ camp, on the other hand, argues that “this time it’s
different”: contemporary iterations of automation and digitization
are viewed as being part of a larger “digital revolution” (Avent, 2017)
which is bringing about technologies that are more powerful and ver-
satile than earlier iterations of the Industrial Revolution, and which will
wholly or partially replace human brains rather than just the human
muscle replaced by earlier technologies. The digital revolution, it is
argued, is creating an array of intelligent, adaptive, general-purpose
technologies with hitherto unseen labor-saving potentials for a widen-
ing group of tasks. This group of tasks increasingly includes complex,
skill-intensive work and formerly hard-to-automate manual work like
stitching. The relationship of human and nonhuman work is viewed as
more and more substitutive rather than complementary. In this vein, an
in-depth report of the Executive Office of the President of the United
States (2016, p. 22) commissioned by Barack Obama warns that “the
skills in which humans have maintained a comparative advantage are
likely to erode over time as AI and new technologies become more
sophisticated.” DeLong (2015) argues too that, just like horses once
used to dominate economic production, human labor currently domi-
nates it, but that “peak human” may have been reached.
Pessimists argue that automation is putting a downward pressure on
wages (reflected in stagnating real wages) and an upward pressure on
the rate of profit from capital investment. The detachment of produc-
tivity gains and wage growth observed since the 1970s in many OECD
countries is brought forward as evidence. Automation, pessimists argue,
may ultimately lead to job losses as technologies create fewer jobs than
Disrupted Development and the Future of Inequality in the Age of Automation