Page - (000348) - in Knowledge and Networks

346 Considering only the sheer overlap of knowledge does not necessarily imply the full exploitation of learning potential, for the remaining novel and complementary knowledge in the partner’s knowledge base is not taken into account (Mowery et al., 1998). The need to broaden that perspective becomes especially relevant in a dynamic examination of collaborations. If the knowledge bases of partners increase disproportionally to the overlap, the novelty potential does not necessarily decrease with overlap over time. Remaining potential for novelty is a key incentive to con- tinue collaboration. Furthermore, collaborations as mutual agreements are estab- lished or continued only if both partners have incentives to engage in them. In general these incentives encompass a certain level of reciprocity: Actors want their invested efforts and competencies to be reciprocated. Seeking potential knowledge flows, actors search for collaboration that they can expect to reciprocate the amount of new knowledge they “offer” the partner (Cantner et al., 2011). The greater this reciprocal potential is, the more attractive they rate the collaborative opportunity to be (Cantner & Meder, 2007). In other words, the likelihood of collaboration increases as the knowledge gains of the respective partners approach equality (referred to as the increase in reciprocal potential). We assume that the search for reciprocity in knowledge gains is also relevant for the continuation of collaboration. Hypothesis 1b The reciprocal potential between two actors is positively correlated with the likelihood of their continued collaboration. Apart from overlap and reciprocal potential, the very process of learning by the partners has consequences for the continuation or termination of collaboration (Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998). We define learning as the outcome of success- ful knowledge transfer, that is, as the successful integration of external knowledge into the given partner’s own knowledge stock. This definition includes the possibil- ity that the newly integrated knowledge is applicable outside the cooperative activ- ity as well (Khanna et al., 1998). When learning potential has been exhausted and the associated knowledge has been transferred, the collaboration becomes obsolete to the partner who benefits from learning (Hamel, 1991). Learning also influences the power distribution among the partners. An asymmetry in learning might lead to an imbalance in bargaining power and dependency structures. Competitive collabo- ration can be understood as a learning race in which the “first learner” gains a higher bargaining power than the lagging partner, who thereby becomes less attractive (Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998). Hence, learning might cause the termination of collaboration by shifting the power balance and by decreasing innovative potential. In this regard the continuity of an alliance can be interpreted as learning failure rather than as success (Hamel, 1991). We hypothesize that the degree of learning determines the continuation of collaboration. In line with the cognitive and power- related arguments, our assumption is that effective knowledge exchange will decrease the incentives to maintain the collaboration. If, on the contrary, knowledge is only shared but not transferred, actors will retain sufficient diversity in knowledge to benefit from the continuation of the collaboration. We thus expect that knowledge U. Cantner et al.