Page - 118 - in Limina - Grazer theologische Perspektiven, Volume 2:1

118 | www.limina-graz.eu hande Birkalan-Gedik | muslim | martyr | masculine the greater transnational space. For example, the recently built mosque in Cologne is financed by the DITIB (Türkisch-islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V./ Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs),4 and it is under the auspice of the Diyanet. The Diyanet is financed by the Turkish tax-payers’ money, regardless of their religious domination (including the Alevis, who have their own house of worship, the Cemevi, or Christians or Jews, who would obviously not go to mosques for worship). In addition to these current practices, further examples of the state con- trolling religion in Turkey can be found in Turkish history: After the found- ing of the Diyanet, the Turkish state declared all Sufi orders to be illegal in 1925 and they were banned from public space. Interesting to note here is that, presented as road to “secularization,” the decree was valid for the dervish lodges and Sufi orders but not for the Sunni mosques. Affected by this step of secularization, however were the Alevis, who had to practice their religion in secrecy and traditionally did not use mosques. Considering the problematic relationship between state and religion, one should also approach official statistics with a degree of caution. The offi- cial statistics declare that Turkey is 99  % Muslim and until recently (2016) this information was included on citizen identity cards.5 This figure of 99  % comprises Hanefis (of the Sunni sect), as well as Shafiis, who make up most of the Kurdish population in Turkey, not to mention the nearly 13 million Alevis.6 It is important to note that Alevism is a syncretic religion, and by their own definition some Alevis consider themselves outside of Is- lam. Furthermore, the claim of a “99  % Muslim population” should not be taken at face value, as it predominantly refers to Sunni Islam. While the Turkish state claims that Alevis are a sect of Islam, it is interesting to note here that after the attempted coup in 2016, the German Alevi Federation distanced itself from the Turkish state and Erdoğan’s politics, criticizing and even protesting its Islamic authoritarianism. As noted earlier, the beginnings of Turkish nationalism always contained subtle Islamic elements and relied on Islamic views and symbols despite its secular claims. This subtlety is visible in the founding nationalist ideol- ogy in Turkey, exemplified by how the martyrs in the War of Gallipoli were talked about using descriptions such as ‘Turks writing history’ (tarih yaz- mak) or ‘composing an epic’ “destan yazmak.” What is important to note 4 The Austrian version is the ATIB, the Avusturya Türkiye İslam Birliği/ Türkisch-Islamische Union in Ös- terreich, which is also financed by the Diyanet in Turkey. 5 In 2016, all ID cards in Turkey were electronically issued. Accord- ing to the European Human Rights Council’s decision, and depending on self-declaration, the religious denomination of the card holder could be electronically stored on the card’s chip, but not displayed on the card. 6 Determining the “exact” number of Alevis both in Turkey and in Eu- rope is difficult for many reasons. Firstly, because of centuries-long oppression, massacres, othering, labeling, and social exclusion, Alevis practiced their religion in secrecy. The Alevi presence in Turkey became an openly public issue first due to internal and then transnational migration. Today, even with the so-called “Alevi opening” in Turkey, the number of Alevis remains only an “estimate” in Turkey, with dif- ferent statistics presented by dif- ferent sources, ranging from 5 to 25 The establishment of the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (the Directorate of Religious Affairs) illustrates the state’s overt desire to control religion through its secularist vision.