Page - 133 - in Limina - Grazer theologische Perspektiven, Volume 2:1

133 | www.limina-graz.eu hande Birkalan-Gedik | muslim | martyr | masculine different parts of the Bosphorus, as well as schools and bridges still carry the names of martyrs. These few examples show that it is difficult to change this intractable rela- tionship, as the motto “at, avrat, silah” (horse, women, and arms) defines the ideal of men in Turkey, and the notion of being a “man” is deeply root- ed in the military and the masculinist vision of nationalism. Recently, the Deutsche Welle (German broadcaster) stated in an article that “Turkey takes its nationalism with a dose of Islam” (Facsar 2017). It is true that the new nationalism in Turkey is using Islamic elements in its image. Throughout this paper I aimed to show that the ruling party wants to sus- tain its political power through the use of these Muslim elements, increas- ingly relying on discourses of martyrdom in the wake of the attempted coup on 15 July 2016. Turkey’s president Erdoğan selectively uses images of martyrdom to cast a long-lasting imprint on the “national memory” in Turkey by erecting monuments—one in Ankara and the other one in Istan- bul. In light of recent perilous events, the AKP’s new nationalism should be read as a cautionary tale. Because all nationalisms are particularistic movements they do not make claims of one single “humanity.” To the contrary, they are based on “ethnocentric” views in which national or religious identity play a central role. The earlier visions of nationalism in Turkey maintained that being a Turk has been characterized as westernized, secular, and Eu- ropean. In this definition, religion remained in the background. Yet, this should not mean that, for example, Muslim Kurds or Christian Armenians or Greeks were not the “other” under the earlier nationalist state, based on ethnic and religious differences. To the contrary, there have been ethnic conflicts and cleansing in the history of the Turkish Republic. Today, the new nationalism of the AKP treats being Muslim as equal to being a Turk, but no longer associates Turkishness only with Kemalist nationalism. The current state of “religious nationalism” in Turkey perhaps can be better understood in comparison to the case in Israel. I would like to turn to the Israeli scholar Uri Ram, whom I referred to at the beginning of this article. According to him, the Israeli political culture had moved from an axis of strong nationalism/weak religionism in its early Zionist days to strong na- tionalism/strong religionism today. This category shows strong parallels to Kemalist nationalism. In short, as any form of religious nationalism has the potential to cast the “other” in religious terms, the AKP’s attempts on Turkish identity with a heavy dose of Islam should also be approached with caution.