Page - 111 - in Otto Bauer (1881–1938) - Thinker and Politician

a contribution to the theory of imperialism 111 inAustria-Hungary.Inhisanalysis,hefocusedonthecausesthatledtoastruc- turalcrisisinAustria(especiallyintheyears1921–2),whilebeinglessinterested initscourseandconsequences.72Speakingasadedicatedpoliticianratherthan asa theorist, Bauerappealed to fact to reveal thecomplexityanddiversityof factors that decisively influenced the recession of theAustrianpostwar eco- nomy.He included the followingcauses: (1) economic–Austria’s lossof eco- nomicterritories, resulting inasmallermaterial,domesticandlabourmarket, theoutflowof foreigncapitalandtheweaknessofdomesticcapital, the intro- ductionofprotectivetariffsoncommoditiesexportedfromAustria; (2)demo- graphic–declineinpopulationandchangesinitsstructure; (3)political–the necessity of payingwar reparations; (4) technological-administrative – poor workorganisation, lowefficiencyandqualityofworkdueto insufficient tech- nological progress, and the introduction of new scientific solutions.73 I will allowmyself todisagreewithSiegfriedMattl, according towhomBauerover- lookedanimportantaspectwhenexplainingthecausesof structuralcrisis. In Mattl’sview,Bauerneglectedthepoliciesofdomesticbanks,whichorientated towards exporting capital to Eastern Europe instead of promoting domestic production, thisbeingunfavourable toAustria.74 In fact,Bauerdidnoticethis aspect–yethisanalysesledhimtoconclusionswhichwerenotentirelycorrect: that theprocessofworkrationalisationcanprovidea foundationforprevent- ing crises, and that technological development is only possible in vast eco- nomicterritories.Notably,thesecondconclusionhadpoliticalundertonesand served tobuttressan ideapropagatedbyBauer: thatofannexing theGerman partofAustriatotheGermanEmpire. After the fall of themonarchy, Bauer had doubts as to whether a coun- try as small as Austria could survive, which served as one of his reasons for demandingtheannex.Nonetheless,hewasagainsttheideaofAustriabecom- 72 The labour market of the First Republic had the characteristics of a semi-colony: in the best year, the unemployment ratewas at 8.3 percent. The official statistics served to conceal the dramatic situation in the industry, where the unemployment rate was at 30 percent in 1927. Compared to the period before the war, the investment ratio hadgonedown.Not before 1929did the total industrial output reach the levels of 1913. Already in 1929, however, the crisis affected steel production and the paper and tex- tile industries – in 1930, production in these branches fell by 50 percent compared to the year before. In 1933, industrial production decreased by 38 percent compared to 1928, andunemploymentaffected33percentof those capableofwork. SeeWeber 1984, p.38. 73 SeeBauer1976l,pp.639–40. 74 SeeMattl 1985,p.83.