Seite - 16 - in JRFM - Journal Religion Film Media, Band 02/01

16 | Stefan Lorenz Sorgner www.jrfm.eu 2016, 2/1, 15–22 organic and the inorganic. These examples are an arbitrary selection; others could be mentioned too. One might wonder what is the problem with these distinctions, for we use them every day and it is at least not immediately clear why employing them might be problematic. The first problems I recognised, while still a teenager, were related to the distinc- tion between the immaterial mind and the material body. If human beings consist of two such radically separate substances, how is it possible for mind and body to inter- act? If two substances do not have anything in common, then any kind of interaction seems highly unlikely.1 I next recognised evaluations of the two substances: the im- material world was usually related to the good, stability, and unity; the material world was connected with evil, change, and plurality.2 This conceptualisation of the world understands as good something that is univer- sally valid. The good that stands for the qualities connected with the good life can be described and is valid for all human beings, as anthropologically all human beings are identical. All possess an immaterial soul that separates them categorically from all other solely natural beings, like apes, dolphins, and elephants. This way of thinking can still be found in many social contexts, most legal consti- tutions, and sundry moral laws. Only human beings have dignity or personhood. All solely natural beings like animals are things and hence belong to the same category as stones and plants. This position also applies to German Basic Law. Animals are not seen as things, but legally they are to be treated like things. Only human beings pos- sess dignity. This distinction of human beings implies the categorical duality previous- ly mentioned and is a characteristic of Platonic, Stoic, Christian, and Kantian thinking. It also accompanies paternalistic structures and the violent treatment of monsters, and we all are monsters in one way or the other.3 Furthermore, only one concept of the good is supposed to be valid for all human beings. The characteristics of what has been recognised as the good, however, have varied in history. For Plato the cardinal virtues were seen as sole good, and for Aris- totle it was a combination of virtues, the good of the body and external virtues. For Stoic thinkers, being virtuous was sufficient for living a good life, and if one possesses one virtue, one immediately possesses all virtues and turns into a moral saint. For Christian thinkers the virtues of love, faith, and hope became relevant, and contem- porary Christian philosophers tend to stress that love is all that is needed for living a good life (love and do what you want) – Michael Sandel and Gianni Vattimo are prime examples of this position.4 What seems problematic with this point of view is that it does not sufficiently con- sider that we are all psychophysiological, with radically different drives, wishes, and 1 Sorgner 2007, 46. 2 Sorgner 2010, 193–211. 3 Sorgner 2013, 135–159. 4 See Eissa/Sorgner 2011.