Seite - 52 - in Loss and Damage from Climate Change - Concepts, Methods and Policy Options

52 I.Wallimann-Helmeret al. particularly vulnerable countries tomanage their increasing financial risks due to increasingly frequentandsevereextremeweatherevents, and(3)curativemeasures suchas redressandrehabilitationmechanisms to tackle irreversible impactsdue to progressive slow-onsetprocesses (e.g. sea level rise, oceanacidification, increasing landand sea surface temperatures) and sudden-onset extremeevents that cannot or will notbeavoided. Factoring in thedistinctionbetweeneconomicandnon-economicL&D, it seems clear that risk management and risk-financing mechanisms—the intuitively most plausible tools to deal with L&D—will not be sufficient in all cases (Surminski et al. 2016).This iswhy, in addition to comprehensive riskmanagement, including risk-financing tools such as insurance, wemay require curative action for redress and rehabilitation (Mechler and Schinko 2016). Such action may address a fur- ther important pillar of L&Dmeasures, namely climate-related impacts that are deemeduninsurable.This is eitherbecause insurance isnot the right instrument for tacklingcertainclimate-related impacts,particularly those linkedtoslow-onsetpro- cesses, suchas lossof territorywithattendanthumandisplacement (Burkett 2014), orbecausecommercial insurance is justnot economically feasible. Furthermore, it notonlymakesadifferencewhether risksofclimate impacts are insurableornot. It alsomakes adifferencewhetherL&Dmeasures aredesigned to tackle sudden-onset extreme events or slow-onset processes.While risk financing instruments suchas insurancearea theoretically feasible strategy to tackle extreme event risks, insurance isnot applicable todealwithpotentialL&Dcausedbyslow- onset processes. Indeed, insurancemechanisms also have been found to encounter limitations even in the case of sudden-onset risks (Mechler et al. 2014; chapters on insurance in thisbookbySchäfer et al. 2018andLinnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018). Insurancemayonlybeavailableforcertainriskswithinacertainprobabilityrangeor forwhatwouldbeconsidered“acceptable”bythoseunderwritingtothe“risksbased” distinction between adaptation andL&Dand, hence,maynot apply toL&D.Risk transferandsharingschemesdonotdirectly reduce theprobabilityofoccurrenceor theseverityofnegative impactsfromclimaterisks,althoughtheycanprovideincen- tives to that end (Linnerooth-Bayer andMechler 2009).Moreover, inappropriately constructed insurance schemes can have unwanted consequences andmay neither benefit thepoornor foster climate resilience (VividEconomics2015). What seems to be needed to appropriately address L&D is something like the “Multi-Window Mechanism to address loss and damage” suggested by AOSIS (AOSIS 2008) or what Roderick and Verheyen (2008) as well as Burkett (2014) call a “CompensationProtocol” anda“Small IslandCompensationandRehabilita- tionCommission todealwith impactsof slow-onsetprocesses” (alsocf.Boranand Heath2016).9However,inoursuggestedframingthefocusofsuchinstitutionswould notonlybeoncompensationandidentifying thewrong-doersbut ratherondistribu- tive justice.Thiswouldamount to redistributivemechanismsaimingat eveningout 9ThemechanismsuggestedbyAOSISconsistsof three inter-dependent components: (1) an insur- ancecomponent, (2)arehabilitation/compensatorycomponent,and(3)ariskmanagementcompo- nent,which taken together aimatenhancingoverall adaptivecapacities inSIDS.