Seite - 169 - in Loss and Damage from Climate Change - Concepts, Methods and Policy Options

6 ThePoliticsof (andBehind) theUNFCCC’sLoss… 169 6.4.2 Liberalism Bystressing the role playedbypreferences, liberalspoint to their interdependence as a determinant of bargaining outcomes. Some liberals ascribe particular impor- tance to economic preferences in determining state behaviour. In the L&D case, developed countries would be incentivised to support their vulnerable developing counterparts so as to guarantee their viability as commercial partners or to safe- guard their delocalised supply-chains. Global trade systems can indeed transmit a variety of negative impacts, as exemplified by the billion dollar losses incurred by theAmericancorporationIntel that resultedfromthecollapseof theThaielectronic industry following flooding in 2011 (Struck 2011).Actually, this liberal argument wasalsoemployedbyAOSISwhenitcalledonthe internationalcommunity tocon- sider the“increasedinterdependenceofglobaleconomyandsociety”andtoaddress “the cascading effects that climate change impacts in poor and vulnerable regions cangloballyhave”as itwouldbe“cost-effective” (AOSIS2008). It isworthnoting, however, that this argumentwas incidentallyusedbydevelopingcountries and that they largelyapproached thedebate inethical and legal terms. Whilemaking the case for increased international cooperation onL&D, liberal theoryalsoallowsforhighlightingsomeofthe“hamperingfactors”thathaveaffected developing countries inL&Dnegotiations. These are related to the liberal concep- tualisation of power, which differs significantly from realist theory. According to KehoaneandNye(1977),oneformofinternationalinfluencederivesfromthe“asym- metric interdependence” of preferences among states. Themore interdependent a state is and themore intense its preference for a given outcome, themore power others potentially have over it (Moravcsik 2008). In other words, the salience an actor attaches to an issue is inversely linked to its success at the negotiating table as the actorwill bemorewilling tomake concessions to get the result (Schneider 2005).Moreover, salience is linked to the existence of an outside option: if a state has alternatives to the negotiated agreement itwill exploit the circumstance to ask forahigher“price”totakepart init.TranslatingthisreasoningtoL&Dnegotiations, iteasytoseehowAOSIShasnegotiatedsincethebeginningfromadisadvantageous position. By virtue of their extreme vulnerability and the existential threat posed byclimatechange, small islandsstatescanonlyrelyonambitiousmitigationefforts andsupportforadaptationandrehabilitationbydevelopedcountriestoaddressL&D. Thishastwointertwinedimplications:(i)astheydonothavecontrolovertheissueat stake (mostly in termsofmitigation), small islandstatescandonothingbutwait for developedcountries toact; and (ii) nothavingbargainingpower, small islandstates are forced toaccept a sub-optimal solutioncompared towhat theywouldprefer. Beyondsalience, liberalsstress the importancethatdomesticactorshaveinshap- ingnegotiatingoutcomes.Governmentsfacingastrongoppositionbackhome—and thus looking less powerful—can convince counterparts that only aminimumcom- mitment ispossible(Schneider2005).Whilenot reallyapplyingtoAOSIS’member states (as domestic actors should agreewith the survival of their country), this can be observed in a relevant counterpart of theL&Ddebate: theUS.One of the leit-