Seite - 192 - in Loss and Damage from Climate Change - Concepts, Methods and Policy Options

192 F.SimlingerandB.Mayer 7.4.3 RelationshipBetween theClimateRegime and theNo-HarmPrinciple Apossibleobjectiontothereasoningpresentedinthissectionrelatestotheexistence of a treaty-based international climate law regime. Some scholars argued that the UNFramework Convention on Climate Change and following treaties as well as decisionsadoptedbytheConferenceofthePartiesprecludedtheapplicationofnorms of international lawsuchas theno-harmprincipleandthe lawofstate responsibility forL&D(seeZahar2015). Suchanargumentwouldhavetobebasedonthedoctrineof lexspecialis(“special law”). This notion prescribes that amore specific rule prevails over a general one. However, this is only the casewhen there is an actual norm conflict between the two rules. In this context, the InternationalLawCommission stated that for the lex specialisdoctrinetoapply,“it isnotenoughthat thesamesubjectmatter isdealtwith by twoprovisions; theremust be some actual inconsistency between them, or else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the other” (ILC 2001:140; seealsoMavrommatisPalestineConcessions:31).Absentsuchactual inconsistency or discernible intention to exclude themore general rule, both rules should be “be interpretedsoastogiverisetoasinglesetofcompatibleobligations”(ILC2006:178). Thereiscertainlynogroundtobelievethatstates,asawhole, intendedtoexclude the applicationof theno-harm rulewhenestablishing the international climate law regime. Similarly, inconsistencies between the climate regime and the customary no-harm rule do not necessarily arise (Mayer 2014;Verheyen 2005). The ultimate objective of theUNFCCC, to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interferencewith theclimatesystem”(UNFCCC,art.2), iscertainlynotinconsistentwiththeno-harm principle,andthespecificcommitmentsmadebystatesundersuccessiveinternational climate agreements do not exclude the existence of more demanding obligations undercustomaryinternational law.Theobligationtopreventsignificant transbound- aryharm, insofar as itmayapply to emissionsof greenhousegases, should thusbe interpretedconsistentlywith theclimate regime“soas togive rise toa single set of compatibleobligations” (ILC2006a,para.4).Hence, thecommitmentsentered into through the climate regime do not replace the no-harm rule—and vice versa –but both simultaneouslywork towards bringing states closer to compliancewith their obligationsarisingunder international law(seeMayer2018b). In this regardanum- ber of vulnerable states havemade several statements emphasising that successive internationalclimatechangeagreementsdonot inprinciplederogate theapplication ofprinciplesofgeneral international law(seee.g.DeclarationsofKiribati,Fiji, and Nauruuponsignatureof theUNFCCCandotherdeclarationsuponsignatureof the ParisAgreement.Arguably, the customary rule, should it apply andbe triggered in the context of climate change, requires efforts that go beyond that of the climate regime inso far as thosearenot sufficient toactuallypreventharm.