Seite - 216 - in Loss and Damage from Climate Change - Concepts, Methods and Policy Options

216 O.Serdeczny compensation is not possible, leaving ends-displacing compensation as the only option.Goodin argues for themoral superiority ofmeans replacing compensation as it does not forcibly interfere with the “unity and coherence in a person´s life” (Goodin 1989:68) and does not undermine a person´s autonomy. In contrast, in ends-displacingcompensation,peopleare forced toshift theirgoalsandpursuenew ends, as if their preferences and goals were “one undifferentiatedmass” (Goodin 1989:67). For responses toNELD thismeans thatways should be sought that allow those affected topursue the samegoals asprior to the loss.Whether andhowexactly this canbeachievedwill dependon the loss inquestion as somebut not all incommen- surable values are irreplaceable.Designing responses to unavoidedNELD impacts will consequently requirea thoroughunderstandingof the function that a lostvalue had for thoseaffectedby its loss.For example, if a community is forced to relocate andisfacedwithlossof traditionalknowledgethenlocationsforrelocationcouldbe soughtwhichallowasmuchoftheknowledgetostillbeappliedaspossible.Granting migrants the rights needed to re-establish their livelihoods according to their own preferenceswouldbeanotherwayofeffectivemeans-replacement inorder toenable thepursuit of lost ends. In caseswhere no substitute forwhat has been lost is conceivable, asmight for examplebethecasewithlossoflivesorsacredplaces, it isimportanttoacknowledge that ends-displacing compensation does not legitimise the policy that led to this loss (Goodin 1989:73). This does not imply that ends-displacing compensation, as for example monetary compensation for irreplaceable goods, should be avoided. Indeed, claims for compensation for culture loss as quoted by (Kirsch 2001) show that communitiesaffectedbysuch losses seek justice through the formofmonetary recompensedespitetheperceivedincommensurabilityofculturewhichconceptually prohibits its economicvaluation.Thismight appear as conceptual inconsistencyor dishonesty by those affected.However, asO´Neill (2001) argues, forward-looking economic valuations are distinct frombackward-looking ones in that the latter are associatedwith notions of rectificatory justicewhereas the former are not. Along these lines, monetary compensation for irreplaceable or incommensurable goods does not imply that those goods are replaced or that their value can be expressed onasingle scale.Rather, ends-displacingcompensation is anaspectof rectificatory justice and “surely better than nothing” (Goodin 1989:73), but it does not right a wrong. In the context of climate policy this translates into the clear preference that needs to be given tomeasures that prevent the risk of losses and damages, even if thedifferencebetweenavoidingandcompensatingwerecost-neutral.Finally,where losses are irreplaceble and require that thoseaffectedare forced to shift their goals, as will be the case with many of the non-economic values already observed and projected, it needs tobeacknowledged that a residueofmoralwrongwill remain.