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21 InsuranceasaResponse toLossandDamage? 485
Insimpleterms, insuranceallowsoneparty(theinsuredorpolicyholder) totrans-
fer the riskof future economic losses to a secondparty (the insurer)willing tobear
this risk for the payment of a premium.By transferring the risk ex ante, insurance
clientsareguaranteedpaymentsfor theagreeduponlossesanddamagesfromevents
expost. In thiswayinsurance,asoneofanumberofriskfinancing instruments,pro-
vides reimbursement in return for thepayment of apremiumsuch that households,
businesses, governments andwhole regions can recover in a timelyway from the
damages fromextremeevents. In addition,manyargue that insurancegoesbeyond
post-disaster reimbursement to pro-actively prevent damages from occurring (see
chapter by Schäfer et al. 2018). By ‘pricing’ risk and requiring preventativemea-
sures, insurance provides (in theory) incentives or conditions for clients to adopt
damage-reducingbehaviourandmake investments to reduce their risks.
Insurance thusappears toserve thegoalsofdisaster riskreduction(DRR)aswell
as post-disaster reimbursement. If insurance payouts are viewed as compensation
for losses anddamages, insurance serves as apreventative andcurative instrument,
therefore responding toWIMaspirations as (differently) voiced by developed and
developing countryparties (see chapter byCalliari et al. 2018). It is not surprising,
then, that insurance has figured so prominently in the L&Ddiscussions andwork
plan.However,while these insurancecharacteristicshavemotivated thediscussions
on insurance as a tool to address climate-attributed losses and damages, they raise
questions essential to theWIM deliberations.Most fundamentally, can insurance
beviewedasanequitable curativemeasure for climate-attributed impacts and risks
incurredbypoorcommunities invulnerablecountries?This in turn raisesquestions
concerning burden sharing: How are premiums determined and who pays them?
Another central question concerns the disaster-risk-reduction (DRR) potential of
insurance. Are insurance instruments, as they are currently practiced, effective in
encouragingprevention and risk reduction by incentivising or requiring adaptation
and resilience investments?
Byexaminingtheseandotherquestions, thischapterexplores theextent towhich
insurance—provided through privatemarkets or public institutions—canmeet the
differentiatedWIM ambitions of reducing and compensating for Loss and Dam-
age.Thediscussion focuses on recent evidence frommicro-insurance and regional
sovereign insurancepoolsas theseare themostcommontypesofcatastrophe insur-
ancecurrentlyoperating indevelopingcountries,whichhasgiven themaparticular
standing theL&Ddiscussions.
After an overview of catastrophe insurance and its role for loss and damage
from climate change (Sect. 21.2), the discussion turns to the benefits and costs of
insurance (Sect. 21.3), before it examines insurance as a tool for preventing the
economic impacts from extremeweather events (Sect. 21.3) and for reimbursing
the residual loss anddamage (the curative aspect) (Sect. 21.4)with examples from
micro-insuranceprogramsand regional insurancepools.The chapter concludes (in
Sect.21.5) that insurance instrumentsbasedonthe‘mutualityprinciple’ (premiums
reflect risk plusmarkupor ‘load’)will fall short ofmeeting the ‘preventative’ and
‘curative’aspirationsunderlyingtheWIMandParisAgreement;however,insurance