Seite - 501 - in Loss and Damage from Climate Change - Concepts, Methods and Policy Options

21 InsuranceasaResponse toLossandDamage? 501 differentiated from legal liability,maybenecessary, if not essential, formotivating evenvoluntary support for insurance instruments on the scale contemplated by the L&Ddiscussions. Principlesof solidarity andaccountability are stronglyvoiced in theFramework ConventiononClimateChange (UNFCCC),which states that parties should act to protecttheclimatesystem“onthebasisofequalityandinaccordancewiththeircom- monbut differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (UnitedNations 1992). A fundamental element of this principle, which is restated in the preamble to the ParisAgreement, is the need to take account of the different circumstances, particularlyeachState’scontributiontotheproblemandcapacitytoremedyit(Deci- sion3/CP.19).TheWIM,likewise,referstotheneedtotakeaccountofdifferentiated responsibility (accountability) for losses and damages (Lees 2016).The principles set out in theUNFCCCand ParisAgreement suggest that those bearing responsi- bility for lossesanddamages,and thosemost capableofaddressing it, shouldbear someobligation tocontribute to insurancepremiums for climate-attributed risks in highly vulnerable countries. In fact, many developing country Parties and NGOs haveadvocatedtheaccountabilityprinciple.ThesubmissionofCAREtothecurrent WIMworkplan is illustrative: …(WIM)shouldapplyprinciplesofglobalequity, includingtakingintoaccounta“polluter pays”-basedapproach togeneratingfinanceforaddressing lossanddamagefromcountries, companies and institutions who significantly contribute to the causes of climate change through fossil fuel emissions (CAREInternational2017). Invokingresponsibility/accountabilityinthediscourseondevelopedcountrysup- port (but avoiding legal liability) changes the paradigm of post-disaster support from ‘charity’ to ‘amends’, which has significance in terms of allocating funds beyondhumanitarianassistancebudgets.Arguably,aresponsibility-baseddiscourse can change themotivation for assisting victims of climate-attributed impacts and risks—soessential to implementing theParisAgreementandmaintaining itsvolun- tary, cooperation-focusedapproach (seechapterbySchinkoet al. 2018). 21.5.2 ExperienceofMicro-insurance forEquitably Allocating theImpactsandRisksBurden Almostwithoutexceptionmicro-insuranceschemesthatserve theresource-poorare subsidisedeitherbynational taxpayer fundsor,moreoften,by internationaldonors, internationalfinancialinstitutions,NGOsandofficialdevelopmentassistance(Mech- ler et al. 2006;Schäfer andWaters2016).Fewprivate insurers areoptimistic about the prospects of providing non-subsidised insurance to clients below the poverty level (SwissRe2012). Asoneexample,India’sNationalAgriculturalInsuranceScheme(NAIS),globally thelargestmicro-insurancecropprogram,targetsmainlymiddle-incomefarmersand isheavilysubsidisedbyIndiantaxpayers(Mechleretal.2006).Asanotherexample, thepro-poorR4initiativediscussedaboveismadepossiblebythesignificantsupport it receives fromNGOs and donors as well as its reliance on funds (in Ethiopia)