Seite - 23 - in Otto Bauer (1881–1938) - Thinker and Politician

otto bauer andhis time 23 the empire, didnot correspondwith thepreferenceof theGerman-speaking parts of Austria’s population. The national consciousness of the societywas torn.TheywereAustrians, yet theyconsidered themselvesGerman.Thiswas accompanied by the notion that German culturewas superior to other cul- tures within the empire. While nationalist tendencies and the demand for AnschlusswereespeciallypronouncedintheGreaterGermancamp,theywere farfromunknownintheChristianSocialPartyandthesdap.VictorAdlerwas among the advocates of unification, andBauer continued the legacy in con- sideringAnschlussthecentralquestionofhisforeignpolicy.Heenvisionedthe creationofabodyofGermanstateswithcentrallyadministeredforeignandfin- ancialpoliciesandcontinuedautonomyindomesticquestions.Bauerstressed threeaspectsof theAnschluss: national, economic, andpolitical (revolution- ary).TheworkingclassofAustria,whichdidnotdesireclose links toPrussian Germany,was largelyhostile to this idea. Ithadstrongreservationsabout the sdap’seffortsforreunification,suchasitsofficialrecognitionoftherequestfor Anschlusson6 June 1917, and repeatedappeals forAnschluss in thenational programmeof the left in January 1918. Bauerwas fully aware of these senti- ments,andheknewthatthepartyleadershiphadmisgivingsabouttheunific- ationquestion.What ismore,heexpectedthatthevictoriouscountrieswould resistanysuchattempts.AsearlyasOctober 1918, anactivepropagandacam- paign in favourofAnschlussbegan. Bauerpublisheda series of articles illus- tratingitshistoricalnecessityintheArbeiter-Zeitung,attemptingtoseducethe workersaswellasthepartymajoritytohispositions.AsViktorReimanironic- ally commented, ‘for the first and last time,hiswillingness toactwasgreater than his habit of cautiously evaluating all possibilities’.58 Yet Bauer’s efforts failed. It is true that the 1 November 1918 plenumof the sdap declared the Anschlussdemand anofficial aimof the party, andBauer’s Berlin talkswith theGermanChancellor, FriedrichEbert, culminated ina secret arrangement concerning Anschluss on 2 February 1919. However, these plans were never put into practice due to the opposition of the Entente powers. Of all coun- tries,Franceprotestedmostvehementlyagainsttheagreement,fearingasurge inGermanpower andapotential reconstructionof theGerman super-state. Czechoslovakia alsoopposed theproject. Equally remarkable is the fact that the Anschluss foundno support from theGerman government,which in its political calculations considered theAustrianquestionof secondary import- ance.59Consequently,theFrenchPrimeMinister,GeorgesClémenceau,hadno 58 Reimann1968,p.284. 59 Among thosewhospokeoutagainst anAnschlusswasalso theChancellor, PaulHirsch,