Seite - 274 - in Otto Bauer (1881–1938) - Thinker and Politician

274 chapter 6 Similarly, Seipel’s offer didnotmean that he recognised the SocialDemo- crats asequalpartners.Nordid it imply that theChristianSocialswere revis- ing their political line, even if certain factions of that party were prepared to co-operatewith the Social Democrats at the end of the 1920s. According to Staudinger, the leadershipof theChristianSocials’ parliamentary clubdid not intendtogrant thesdapproportional representationinafuturecoalition government.49Seipel’smotivations for theofferofacoalitionwereprompted by theChristian Socials’ anxiety that the state could progress in an increas- ingly authoritariandirection. In light of electoral losses andeconomic crisis, theywereworried that theymightnotbeable to salvagedemocracyon their own.TheSocialDemocratsofferedtworeasons fordeclining theoffer.Firstly, thepositiongrantedtotheSocial-Democraticparty inacoalitiongovernment wouldhavebeen far tooweak. Secondly, participation in suchagovernment wentagainstthewishesofthepartymajority.50Bauer’scrowningargumentwas his claim that ‘the sheer act of SocialDemocrats entering governmentwhen capitalismissubjecttotheheaviestturmoil…wouldputusatthegreatriskof merelyco-administeringtheaffairsofcollapsingcapitalismaspartofthisgov- ernment,whilenotbeingabletoadequatelyservetheinterestsoftheworking classandidealsofsocialism’(ourtranslation).51TheSocialDemocratswanted 1918bis 1920abgesehen–denbourgeoisenCharakterdesStaatswesensnichtaufheben’ - Bauer1930b,p.310. 49 SeeStaudinger1984,p. 12. 50 JuliusDeutschwastheonlymemberofthepartyleadershiptospeakinfavourofentering a coalition. Renner, who had been waiting for such an opportunity for years, agreed withBauer.Modernhistoriansdisagreeoverwhether theSocialDemocrats shouldhave joinedthegovernmentin1931–seeStaudinger1984,p.6;Simon1984,p. 12;Maimannand Mattl 1984,pp.6–7.AsHaasstates,apartialcollaborationbetweenSocialDemocratsand ChristianSocials existed from1932–3 in someprovinces, e.g. LowerAustria, despite the sdap’s rejectionof thecoalitionoffer.After 15March 1933, thesdap leaderswereprone to apolitics of compromise. TheyofferedDollfuss a co-operationagainst theNazis, for instance,whichthechancellordeclined.SeeHaas1990,p.422andp.424. 51 ‘…[D]erbloßeEintrittvonSozialdemokratenindieRegierungindieserZeitderschwer- stenErschütterungdesKapitalismus…würdeunsindiegroßeGefahrbringen,dasswirin dieserRegierungnurdieGeschäftedeszusammenbrechendenKapitalismusmitadminis- trierensolltenundnichtinderLagewären,wirklichdenInteressenderArbeiterklasseund den IdealendesSozialismus in ihrentsprechendzudienen’– sdap 1931, inDocuments, Programmes,Protocols,p.29. ItseemsjustifiedtoassumethattheSocialDemocrats’par- ticipation ingovernmentwouldhave involveda joint effort to save thebankruptbanks andthereforeinevitablywouldhaveledtocuttingunemploymentallowances.AsRenner mentionedinlightofBauer’sstrongresistance,joiningthecoalitionwouldhaveonlybeen