Seite - 95 - in Radical Solutions and Open Science - An Open Approach to Boost Higher Education

100 D.Burgos follow-up or analytical tracking, leading to a blurry conclusion regarding its rele- vance.With thedata in hand, the conclusion centres on the imbalancebetween the resources investedandthebenefitsreported,allowingustoinfer that realknowledge transferhasa relativeeffect. What is certain is the linking of research projects. For instance, in research onTechnology-EnhancedLearning (TEL, online learning or eLearning),Derntl& Klamma(2012),and laterde laFuenteValentín,Carrasco,Konya,&Solans, (2013) showed theconcentrationofpublic funding recipients in this sphereof research: an analysisof77and93projects in these twostudies, respectively, fromtheFP6,FP7, andeContentplus(ECP)programmes,ledtotheconclusionthatahalf-dozenpartners pooledmost of the projects andfinancing, forming 27 commonwork pairs among them: Open Universiteit Nederland (Netherlands), The Open University (United Kingdom), theCatholicUniversity ofLeuven (Belgium), IMCAG(Germany), the UniversityofHannover(Germany),andtheUniversityofJyväskylä(Finland).Curi- ously, the data sources of these analyses are no longer accessible except for a few analytical reports, so it is impossible to compare the information.Another case in the area of innovation (Competitiveness and InnovationFrameworkProgramme— CIP-) isIntrasoft,aLuxembourg-basedcompanythat linkedprojectsabout thesame subject duringFP7 (education in science, technology, engineering, andmathemat- ics,orSTEM), formore thane25million(CORDIS,2019).Therearesimilarcases organisedbycategory, country, programmes, andprofessional areas (Health,Aero- nautics,Security, etc.).Thiseffective linking impliesan inbredpseudo-transference of knowledge, like a cycle where one project’s results feed the next, but have no effective impact outside the circuit. It is undoubtedly a case of circular economy, currentlymuch in fashion,butwithacreative interpretation. Wefind a clear cause in the lack of post-project follow-up.At best, a project is approvedandfinal funding is collected (afterpartial disbursements) after reviewby external expertswithnoneedof subsequent reports.On theotherhand, theabsence ofaneffectivemechanismforcollectingsubsidies forprovableresultsobtaineddur- ing theproject andafter its completion implies that theproject’s limit shouldbe its owntimeframefor implementation,withoutconsidering thecommodificationof the results.Atmost,atheoreticalplanfortransferringtheknowledgeisrequired,butwill neverbeproven,asstatedearlier.Thesolutionlies inaseriesofmeasures,whichare notnecessarilypopularones: (1) implement thesemechanismsandreserveapartof the subsidy, asperaccomplishmentmetrics, for effectivecommodificationonce the implementationperiodhasended;(2)paybyobjectivesreachedandverified,together with—forat leastpartof the total- anex-post follow-upand impactverification; (3) rewardsuccessfulcommodificationwithfutureR&D+ifunding;(4)establisharank- ing of partners thatweighs the participants according tometrics, including results andappliedproducts and services, aswell as effectivelyverified transfer; (5) sepa- rate theassessmentand reviewofprojects fromthefinancingagency; (6) ensureno connectionbetween reviewers andevaluatorswith fundedpartners exists,with suf- ficientmarginsfor theabsenceofarelationship(revolvingdoors);and(7)demanda calibratedscientificandcommodificationreviewbeyondtheminimalviableproduct, notonlyanadministrativeone.