Seite - 173 - in Short-Term Load Forecasting by Artificial Intelligent Technologies

Energies2018,11, 2038 • Taxes: they are also regulated prices, although of a different nature from the previous ones. Thiscomponent isgivenbythespecial taxonelectricity (currently5113%)andVAT(currently 21%). Thiscomponent isalsocommonforall consumers. • Unregulatedprices: thiscomponentof thebillingcontemplates theprice for theenergyconsumed inwholesalemarketandtherefore it isnot regulatedbytheState. It includes thepriceofenergy in theDay-aheadandIntradayMarket, costs forbilateral contracts, costs formeasureddeviations (differencebetweenenergyconsumedandprogrammedenergy),andcosts forancillaryservices. Therefore, theFinalCostof theenergyforaDirectMarketConsumer isgivenby: FinalCostDMC = RegulatedPricesComponent +UnregulatedPricesComponent+Taxes (12) Thepriceofenergy in theDay-aheadorDailyMarket,which isalsocalled themarginalprice, is theresultofmatchingsalesandpurchaseoffersmanagedthedaybefore theenergydispatch. It is thereforeanon-regulatedcomponentof thebilling. ThepriceofenergyintheDay-aheadMarket is determinedforeachof the24hof thedayasaresultof thematching,values thatareavailableonthe websiteof theSystemOperator [44] (RedEléctricaEspañola,REE). It is the largestcomponent (more than80%)of theaveragefinalprice,as it is showninFigure4. Figure4.Componentsof theAverageFinalPrice in2016,price for1MWhineuros. As in theDailyMarket, thepriceofenergy in the IntradayMarket is theresultof thenegotiation ofsalesandpurchaseoffersmanagedinthesessionsheldafewhoursbefore thedispatchofenergy (intradaysessions), andbotharevariableandunregulatedprices. Theprice foreachhourof theday andeach intradaysessionarepostedonthewebsiteof theSystemOperator, in thiscaseREE[44]. Once the daily scope of the agents, consumers, and generators programs has been reached, theprocessesof liquidationof theirenergies (chargesandpayments)actuallyproducedandconsumed are entered,with eachpassing the costs of thedeviation that theyhave incurredbyhave “failed” their respectiveprogramsofproductionandconsumption. Thus, thosewhohavedeviated to rise atacertain time(generators thathaveproducedmore thantheirprogramandconsumerswhohave consumedless thantheirprograms)arepassedonthecorrespondingcost incase thatdeviationhas gone in theoppositedirection(thegeneratorschargeaprice lower thanthemarginalpriceof thehour for theiradditionalproduction,andconsumersreceiveaprice lower thanthemarginalprice theypaid in thathour for their lowerconsumption),while if theirdeviationwas in thesamesenseof theneeds of thesystem,nocost ispassedonto them(generatorscharge themarginalandconsumers receive themarginal). Identical reasoninggoverns the caseofdeviations togodown, inwhichproducers havegenerated less energy than theirprogramandconsumershave consumedmore thanwhat is establishedin their schedule. 173