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Testing Autonomous Systems 67
with traffic regulations, extremely reliable, fast, predictive obstacle detection is
required.
When a robot interacts with objects, damage can also be caused indirectly (in
addition to the danger of damaging the object or robot). The following examples
from[10,p.77] illustrate this:
• A service robot is instructed to bring the dishes to the kitchen sink. In order to deposit
the dishes near to the sink, it recognizes the modern ceramic stove top as preferable
surface and deposits the dishes there... If now a cooking plate is still hot, and there is,
for instance,aplasticsaladbowl,oracuttingboard amongst thedishes,obviously, some
risks arise. The situation in which a plastic orwooden object is located very close oron
top of the cooking plate can be considered as not safe anymore, since the risk of toxic
vapor or fire by inflamed plastic or wood ispotentially present.
The worst case accident can be a residential fire causing human injury or death. The
risk isnotpresent inasituationinwhich theseobjectsare locatedapart thecookingplate
(witha certain safety margin), independent from the state of the cooking plate.
• A service robot is instructed to “watering the plants.” In this connection, it is assumed
that a power plug fell into a plant pot ... If the robot is watering the plant, the risk of
electrical shock arises, both, for human and robot. The risk factors can be considered to
be the following: The object recognition again recognizes the power plug while having
the watering can grasped (or any plant watering device) and additionally, it can be
detected that there is water in the watering can (or similar device). In consequence, a
rule should be integrated that instructs the robot not to approaching too close with the
watering can toapowerplug,or the like, inorder toavoid that it is struck byawater jet.
In order to be functionally safe, a highly or fully autonomous system must
therefore have appropriate capabilities and strategies to identify situations as
potentially dangerous and then respond appropriately to the situation in order to
avoid imminent danger or minimize13 damage as far as possible. The examples
cooking plate and watering the plants make it clear that pure obstacle detection
alone is not always sufficient. In complex operational environments with complex
possiblemissionsof theautonomoussystem, some dangerscan onlybe recognized
if a certain“understanding”ofcause-effect relationships isgiven.
Such capabilities and strategies must be part of the “intelligence” of highly
autonomous systems. The intended system functionality and the necessary safety
functionscannotbe implementedseparately,butare two sidesof thesame coin.
3.2 Safety in FailureMode
If parts of the autonomous system fail, become damaged, or do not function as
intended (because of hardware faults, such as contaminationor defect of a sensor),
13The media in this context mainly discuss variants of the so-called “trolley problem”, that is, the
question ofwhether and how an intelligentvehicle should weigh the injury ordeath of one person
or group of persons at the expense of another person or group of persons in order to minimize the
consequences of an unavoidable accident (see [11]).
The Future of Software Quality Assurance
- Titel
- The Future of Software Quality Assurance
- Autor
- Stephan Goericke
- Verlag
- Springer Nature Switzerland AG
- Ort
- Cham
- Datum
- 2020
- Sprache
- englisch
- Lizenz
- CC BY 4.0
- ISBN
- 978-3-030-29509-7
- Abmessungen
- 15.5 x 24.1 cm
- Seiten
- 276
- Kategorie
- Informatik