Seite - 38 - in VULNERABLE - The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19

VULNERABLE38 and procedures functioned across jurisdictions. Finally, this culture of collaboration would need to be supported by an earmarked funding allocation of $300 million for joint public health activities. The Naylor Report also identified problems in coordination between Canada and international actors, particularly around a lack of clarity about which level of government was to be in contact with the World Health Organization (WHO). WHO’s unanticipated travel advisory for Toronto in April 2003 was at least partly due to the lack of clear and effective communication between levels of government, and thus the need for some form of vertical accountability was a priority. The Naylor Report found that the federal government’s “uncertain authority in the face of a multi-provincial outbreak” was especially problematic, given that WHO moved to establish expectations with regard to surveillance, reporting, and disease outbreak management through its International  Health  Regulations.19 These regulations, which are binding on WHO member states, are designed to “prevent, pro- tect against, control and provide a public health response to the inter- national spread of disease.”20 The need to implement these regulations informed the Naylor Report recommendations and helped to catalyze post-SARS changes to public health in Canada. The Naylor Report’s vision for a new public health system was close to what was finally established by the Public  Health  Agency  of  Canada Act in 2006.21 The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) is a federal agency of the Government of Canada, but the beating heart of the agency is the Pan-Canadian Public Health Network, comprising representatives from each province (generally Chief Medical Officers of Health or Assistant Deputy Ministers), and co-chaired by federal and provincial representatives. The governance model of the new body was ambitious and well received, but not without challenges. One key issue, for example, emerged from the development of electronic health data, and the need to amend privacy laws and to address sharing (as dis- cussed in Amir Attaran & Adam R Houston, this volume, Chapter A-5). While the mandate of the new public health agency went well beyond infectious disease control, the scar left by SARS meant that 19. Supra note 16 at 7. 20. World Health Organization, International  Health  Regulations, 3rd ed (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2005), article 2. 21. Public  Health  Agency  of  Canada  Act, SC 2006, c 5. See also Katherine Fierlbeck, Health  Care  in  Canada:  A  Citizen’s  Guide  to  Policy  and  Politics  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011) at ch 5.