Seite - 46 - in VULNERABLE - The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19

VULNERABLE46 lines, and to respond in a timely manner to their concerns.41 The 2006 Campbell Report noted that “[w]hat we learned from SARS is that what is needed is a process to bring together the various partners— union, management, government, ministries, associations—to address these very complex systemic and legal issues, but we need to do that long before the crisis hits.”42 As the experiences with SARS, H1N1, and COVID-19 all illustrate, seemingly small issues for governmental decision makers (the adequacy of personal protective equipment or the clinical guidelines pulled together to guide health care profession- als) had tremendous importance for health care workers. It is clear that further work on this is needed, not only within hospitals but within other parts of the health sector (namely, long-term care) and other essential parts of the economy (such as workers in the food sup- ply chain who also suffered from high infection rates). What have been the lessons of COVID-19 itself? These will only be identified with confidence once the dust has settled. But some observations are readily apparent now. All jurisdictions have realized the importance of communicating not only with each other but with their citizens to provide clear, consistent, and ongoing information regarding what is happening, what is expected of everyone, and what to anticipate. Chief medical officers of health across Canada have pre- sented themselves as the public face of pandemic messaging. These same individuals have not mistaken consistency with rigidity and have, given the lack of key data and shifting scientific understanding of the virus, been willing to change their messaging when empirical information suggests new insights. We have a better understand- ing of how social structures (long-term care homes, food processing plants, penal institutions) can exacerbate and amplify the spread of disease. We have learned that we have not learned the importance of effective data sharing across jurisdictions. And we are also learn- ing that large-scale pandemics are not phenomena that are isolated in time or space: they affect countless social and economic relation- ships, and must be understood as an ecosystem in themselves. That is why a major pandemic cannot simply be managed by appealing to a central authority. An understanding of intergovernmental rela- tions throughout Canada’s history shows clearly that any intemper- ate exercise of federal emergency powers would be seen as intrusive, 41. See Part E of this volume for an examination of these issues. 42. Supra note 26 at 271.