Seite - 155 - in VULNERABLE - The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19

155Ensuring Executive and Legislative Accountability in a Pandemic government-controlled” Senate with the “new, nonpartisan, inde- pendent Senate” that continues to take shape.”68 It is not uncommon for independent senators to seek amendments to or even vote against government legislation.69 And while the Senate dutifully passed the emergency legislation rushed through in response to the pandemic, Senate Committees are poised to play a significant role in scrutinizing the government’s response to COVID-19. Given that debate in the Senate Chamber and in Senate com- mittees has been limited to date, it is perhaps logical to begin by ask- ing what accountability role senators might be playing off-stage. The picture that emerges is mixed. Thomas reports that senators were involved in the negotiations that preceded Bill C-12 but not those that preceded Bill C-13.70 Regardless of whether senators are playing a role in these informal discussions, however, their “anticipated reactions” are an important consideration in any legislative response to COVID- 19.71 The tendency has been for senators to scrutinize but not ulti- mately impede the passage of government legislation.72 However, it is conceivable that legislation which is perceived as being sufficiently problematic could be delayed in the Senate while amendments are proposed.73 The political disincentives to delay COVID-19-related legislation are, of course, quite strong; however, it is a possibility to which government must be alert. Given the relative independence of individual senators, moreover, anticipated reactions cannot be expected to fall into predictable categories. In short, the Senate’s new- found independence requires the federal government to anticipate and be responsive to a range of potential reactions from senators.74 Some senators have also been making use of spaces off-stage— specifically, the media and the public square—to make the case for 68. Thomas, “New and Improved Senate”, supra note 16. 69. Government Representative Office in the Senate, “Towards an Independent Senate: A Progress Report to Canadians” (22 August 2019), online (pdf): Senate GRO  <senate-gro.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Report-to-Canadians-English. pdf> [GRO, “Progress Report”]; Emmett Macfarlane, “The Renewed Canadian Senate: Organizational Challenges and Relations with the Government” (May 2019), online: IRPP  Study  No 71 <irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ The-Renewed-Canadian-Senate-Organizational-Challenges-and-Relations- with-the-Government.pdf>. 70. Thomas, “Parliament under Pressure”, supra note 5. 71. See generally Russell & Gover, supra note 38 at 67. 72. GRO, “Progress Report”, supra note 69. 73. Macfarlane, supra note 69. 74. Thomas, “New and Improved Senate”, supra note 16; Macfarlane, ibid.