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VULNERABLE292 for indictable offences. The Supreme Court of Canada observed that many homeless defendants cannot afford to pay these fines, which can result in additional fees, unsurmountable civil debts, and impris- onment for default.19 Many of these same considerations apply to fines that are issued to homeless people for violating physical distancing guide- lines. First, the quantum of COVID-19-related fines (roughly $1,500 in Quebec) is substantially higher than the mandatory victim sur- charge (between $100 and $200), which exemplifies the grossly dis- proportionate nature of these fines for homeless people. Second, individual and systemic barriers make it more difficult for homeless people to successfully challenge these financial penalties even where judges retain discretion to modify them.20 As the Supreme Court of Canada observed in Boudreault, many homeless people have men- tal health problems, addiction issues, and other circumstances that make it more difficult to attend court and navigate their way through the justice system.21 This is further complicated by the fact that most courts are currently closed and will have to clear months of back- logs attributable to the pandemic, which will further limit access to justice. Third, the realities of homelessness complicate evidentiary issues. For instance, in Ontario, accused persons can be convicted of provincial offences without a hearing. If an individual wishes to challenge such convictions, they must swear an affidavit that explains that they did not receive a delivery notice or describes why they could not attend a prior court date.22 This additional burden complicates the process for self-represented litigants and may hin- der a successful defence.23 One might argue that harsh financial penalties do not constitute cruel and unusual punishments, because judges retain some discre- tion to modify the quantum of fines in certain circumstances. The Supreme Court of Canada suggested in R  v  Lloyd  and in R v Boudreault that the presence of discretion might prevent an otherwise mandatory punishment from being found to be cruel and unusual.24 Yet financial 19. Ibid at paras 69-73. 20. Terry Skolnik, “Beyond Boudreault: Challenging Choice, Culpability, and Pun- ishment” (2019) 50 Crim R (7th) 283 at 289-91. 21. Boudreault, supra note 6 at para 70. 22. Provincial  Offences  Act, RSO 1990, c P.33, s 11(1). 23. Deborah Doherty, “Promoting Access to Family Justice by Educating the Self- Representing Litigant” (2012) 63 UNBLJ 85 at 86. 24. R v Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13 at para 36; Boudreault, supra note 6 at para 97.