Page - 54 - in Joint Austrian Computer Vision and Robotics Workshop 2020
Image of the Page - 54 -
Text of the Page - 54 -
for these systems are identified and requirements are
defined to eliminate or sufficiently reduce the risks
associated with thesehazards.
Thestructuredprocess fromtheMachineryDirec-
tive down to the EN ISO 10218-2 shows that every
safety-relevant change of the application requires a
renewedriskassessment,unlessthishasalreadybeen
considered in the original assessment. New risk as-
sessments on an already existing work system might
make required modifications impossible due to lim-
itedflexibilityinthedesignorre-design. However, in
order to consider safety-related changes in the orig-
inal assessment, prospective modifications and thus
systemvariantshave tobeconsidered inanearlyde-
sign phase. For this approach, however, the link be-
tweenmodificationsandsafety-relatedaspects isnot
yet clearly explored.
Even though, the Technical Specification for col-
laborative robotic applications, ISO/TS 15066:2016,
presents a correlation of the applied robot’s safety
mode and the system’s respective safety-related
changes, thesafetymode isonlyoneofmanysafety-
relevant modification dimensions within human-
robot work systems [2]. Further, it shows draw-
backs in applying the proposed safety measures, es-
pecially when integrating heavy industrial robots or
sharp objects or estimating the human approach ve-
locity [3]. Additionally, there is no advice consider-
ing the robot’s movement predictability due to col-
lision avoiding path planning or varying task alloca-
tion patterns.
Assafetymodesmightnotbeanappropriateclas-
sification scheme for the identification of safety-
relevant changes, new classifications schemes have
been introduced, such as in [4, 5]. However, af-
ter an extensive literature review, [6] came to the
conclusion that classification schemes for collabora-
tive human-robot work systems are not applied con-
sistently, which may lead to an incorrect identifica-
tion of safety-relevant changes. To counteract this,
model-based approaches have been developed either
basedonformalmathematicalmodels, suchas in[7],
orbasedonsimulationmodels, suchas in [8]. Arisk
management simulator was for example introduced
in [9], whereas [10] introduced a task-based char-
acterization of human-cobot safety. Further, a met-
ric depending on the distance between robot and hu-
man as well as the robot’s structure was introduced
in [11].
However, none of the proposed approaches con- Area A
Area B
conveyor belt
safety mat
UR3 UR10
m
ob il
e
m
an ip ul
at
or feeder
Figure1.Structureof the workplace.
siders a mutual influence of modifications on safety.
In this sense, a structured procedure with the aid of
an Morphological Box (MB) was developed and is
described in detail in the following paper. The pro-
posed approach should support manufacturers and
system integrators in the consideration of safety-
relevant changes in an early design phase of the
planned collaborative human-robot work system in-
cluding itsprospectivemodifications.
2. ImpactofModifications
Within the DR.KORS project on dynamic recon-
figurability of collaborative robotic systems, 50 di-
mensions of modifications were identified directly
influencing the safety of a human-robot system. The
modification dimensions can be classified in work-
piece, end effector, contact points (between human
and robot), speed / acceleration, task / workflow and
operatingconditions/changeofplace. Theimpactof
modificationdimensionswillbepresentedona labo-
ratoryusecaseexampleforassemblingrocker levers.
2.1.UseCaseDescription
In the laboratory use case rocker levers consist-
ingof threeseparatecomponentsareassembledwith
a collaborative human-robot work system. Adjust-
ing bolts are mounted on two separate rocker levers
which are then assembled on a trestle. At this point,
the positioning of the rocker levers on the trestle
needs manual dexterity as the components tilt eas-
ily. Rocker levers and trestles are provided either
by feeders or on a conveyor belt. The manipulation,
54