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272 legitimate and accepted (sometimes even planned) or as contested or sanctioned. Both forms of imitation, friendly and unfriendly, reflect the diametric opposition of competition and cooperation in a network. Conventions of Friendly Imitation In a cooperative context we assume that organizations and their members establish conventions to regulate the process of friendly imitation. Observing the good prac- tice of others, and actively seeking and requesting aid when transferring existing solutions is accepted as legitimate or even as the actual reason for the cooperation if the current owner permits a solution to be imitated. According to (Weber, 1922/1978) conventions fall on a continuum extending from formal law to traditional customs and habits: “an order will be called convention so far as its validity is externally guaranteed by the probability that deviation from it within a given social group will result in a relatively general and practically significant reaction of disapproval” (p. 34). A convention ranges between social custom and law: Unlike deviation from cus- toms, deviation from convention is sanctioned; unlike law, a convention lacks an authority that enforces compliance to it. A convention thus constitutes an institu- tional order for exchange between parties to a transaction, creating a mutually sound basis for expectations. This order cannot penalize violations of the convention through the force of law. Instead, it uses social disrespect. Practices of friendly imi- tation always occur when one firm takes information or solutions from another firm with the latter’s approval. These resources may even be actively provided, often without any direct compensation. That kind of transfer to a partner corresponds to the economic principle of a gift (Ferrary, 2003), a type of generalized exchange in which a transfer is not compensated directly but rather reciprocated over the long term, possibly also by other partners (Yamagishi & Cook, 1993). Examples of friendly imitation practices—processes that could lead to imitation—include rec- ommendations, the exchange of experience or knowledge between employees within and between companies, and specialist discussions at trade fairs. A key factor in maintaining long-term friendly imitation is the convention of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). Unlike goods traded on the market, gifts provided in networks can seldom be assigned a cash value, and that value often cannot be clearly allocated after the exchange. As a rule, reciprocal treatment (Stegbauer, 2011) is of fundamental importance in the convention of friendly imitation. Imitating without authorization or without providing anything yourself violates the convention. Conventions of friendly imitation are the foundations for learning and the rapid adoption, recombination, and dissemination of ideas and solutions within networks. Ultimately, each organization benefits from the solutions from all the other partners in a network, an outcome that offers cost advantages over the long-term innovation process. Imitation without immediate interaction may even forge the creation of J. Glückler and I. Hammer
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Knowledge and Networks
Title
Knowledge and Networks
Authors
Johannes GlĂĽckler
Emmanuel Lazega
Ingmar Hammer
Publisher
Springer Open
Location
Cham
Date
2017
Language
German
License
CC BY 4.0
ISBN
978-3-319-45023-0
Size
15.5 x 24.1 cm
Pages
390
Keywords
Human Geography, Innovation/Technology Management, Economic Geography, Knowledge, Discourse
Category
Technik
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