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legitimate and accepted (sometimes even planned) or as contested or sanctioned.
Both forms of imitation, friendly and unfriendly, reflect the diametric opposition of
competition and cooperation in a network.
Conventions of Friendly Imitation
In a cooperative context we assume that organizations and their members establish
conventions to regulate the process of friendly imitation. Observing the good prac-
tice of others, and actively seeking and requesting aid when transferring existing
solutions is accepted as legitimate or even as the actual reason for the cooperation if
the current owner permits a solution to be imitated. According to (Weber, 1922/1978)
conventions fall on a continuum extending from formal law to traditional customs
and habits: “an order will be called convention so far as its validity is externally
guaranteed by the probability that deviation from it within a given social group will
result in a relatively general and practically significant reaction of disapproval”
(p. 34).
A convention ranges between social custom and law: Unlike deviation from cus-
toms, deviation from convention is sanctioned; unlike law, a convention lacks an
authority that enforces compliance to it. A convention thus constitutes an institu-
tional order for exchange between parties to a transaction, creating a mutually sound
basis for expectations. This order cannot penalize violations of the convention
through the force of law. Instead, it uses social disrespect. Practices of friendly imi-
tation always occur when one firm takes information or solutions from another firm
with the latter’s approval. These resources may even be actively provided, often
without any direct compensation. That kind of transfer to a partner corresponds to
the economic principle of a gift (Ferrary, 2003), a type of generalized exchange in
which a transfer is not compensated directly but rather reciprocated over the long
term, possibly also by other partners (Yamagishi & Cook, 1993). Examples of
friendly imitation practices—processes that could lead to imitation—include rec-
ommendations, the exchange of experience or knowledge between employees
within and between companies, and specialist discussions at trade fairs.
A key factor in maintaining long-term friendly imitation is the convention of
reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). Unlike goods traded on the market, gifts provided in
networks can seldom be assigned a cash value, and that value often cannot be clearly
allocated after the exchange. As a rule, reciprocal treatment (Stegbauer, 2011) is of
fundamental importance in the convention of friendly imitation. Imitating without
authorization or without providing anything yourself violates the convention.
Conventions of friendly imitation are the foundations for learning and the rapid
adoption, recombination, and dissemination of ideas and solutions within networks.
Ultimately, each organization benefits from the solutions from all the other partners
in a network, an outcome that offers cost advantages over the long-term innovation
process. Imitation without immediate interaction may even forge the creation of
J. Glückler and I. Hammer
zurück zum
Buch Knowledge and Networks"
Knowledge and Networks
- Titel
- Knowledge and Networks
- Autoren
- Johannes Glückler
- Emmanuel Lazega
- Ingmar Hammer
- Verlag
- Springer Open
- Ort
- Cham
- Datum
- 2017
- Sprache
- deutsch
- Lizenz
- CC BY 4.0
- ISBN
- 978-3-319-45023-0
- Abmessungen
- 15.5 x 24.1 cm
- Seiten
- 390
- Schlagwörter
- Human Geography, Innovation/Technology Management, Economic Geography, Knowledge, Discourse
- Kategorie
- Technik