Page - 44 - in Loss and Damage from Climate Change - Concepts, Methods and Policy Options

44 I.Wallimann-Helmeret al. L&Dwould be by considering compensatory or rectificatory justice. These kinds of justice considerations define the appropriate remedy for a damage or a loss. A classical compensatory principle, for example, demands that the victim is made whole again.Thevictims shouldfind themselves in the sameconditionas theyhad beenbefore infliction; towit, as theywouldhavebeenhad theharmneveroccurred (Wallimann-Helmer2015;PageandHeyward2016).Accordingtoconsiderationsof compensatoryjustice it iskeytoidentify theinflictorscontributingtotheoccurrence of harm, because, according to themost commonunderstanding of compensation, those causing harm are seen as liable to make those they inflicted whole again. In terms of climate L&D, such a principle requires that those facingL&Dshould bemadewhole againby those liable for theseharms.This isfirst and foremost the majorgreenhousegasemitterswhocontributeorhavecontributedthemosttoclimate changeand in sodoing toclimate-relatedL&D. Although such considerations of compensatory justice are plausible and impor- tant, in the followingwe argue that a different justice framing of how to consider theethical implicationsofclimateL&Dmustbeconsideredalternativelyor incon- junctionwith the intuitive compensatoryview.This alternative framing is basedon considerationsofdistributive justice.There are at least two reasons for considering this alternative framework. First, on pragmatic grounds in light of paragraph52of decision 1/CP.21 such an alternative framingmaymake acceptance of L&Dmea- suresamongpotentialdonorcountriesmore feasible, at leastundercurrentpolitical conditions.This is so,becausedecision1/CP.21makesexplicit that“Article8of the [Paris]Agreementdoesnot involveorprovideabasis forany liabilityorcompensa- tion”(UNFCCC2015).2 Second, thisalternative framingallows to fullycapture the exigenceof thoseactually facingL&Dsince it allowsnotonlyassignmentof reme- dialresponsibilitiesforanthropogenicclimateL&Dasisthecasewithcompensatory claimsbutalsoresponsibilitiesforL&Dcausedbynaturalclimatevariability(reme- dial responsibilities arediscussedat greater length in2.5).Compensatory justice is onlyowed for anthropogenicL&Dbecause, conceptually speaking, those inflicting harmonothers areonlyunder aduty tocompensate for theharms theycausewhile naturalclimatevariation isnotaddressed.For theremainderof this sectionweelab- orateonthedifferencesbetweencompensatoryanddistributivejusticeframings(see Table2.2). CompensatoryJustice Tobetterunderstandthedifferencesinframingethical implicationsofL&Dinterms of distributive justice, it is helpful to clarify some issues in analysing these impli- cations from the perspective of compensatory justice.We can distinguish several prominent and intuitivelyplausibleprinciples to justifydutiesof compensation (cf. Gardiner et al. 2010).As alreadymentioned, in the case of L&D themost plausi- ble responsibility bearer for compensatoryduties is the emitter. The corresponding principle of justice is usually called thePolluter Pays Principle (PPP). A second prominent principle of justice towarrant compensatoryduties identifies thebenefi- 2For other readings on the legal perspective see for exampleLees (2016),Mayer (2017) and the chapterbySimlingerandMayer (2018).