Page - 47 - in Loss and Damage from Climate Change - Concepts, Methods and Policy Options

2 TheEthicalChallenges in theContextofClimateLossandDamage 47 of the harm they face. This is so for three reasons. First, the fact that the main L&Doccurs inregionswhichhistoricallyhavecontributedfar less toanthropogenic climate change seems to unfairly burden those least responsible for these adverse effects. Second, those regions and countries most burdened with L&D are often (economically) lesswellequippedtomanageclimate impactsoncetheymaterialise. Third andmost importantly, sincemany adverse effects of climate change are not immediatebut linked to slowonset events, it seemsappropriate to say that inmany regions of the world we find a situation of more or less acute emergency due to climate change already.5 In our view, it seems clear that in a case of emergency, someone is under duty to assist irrespective of whether that agent has caused the threat (“remedial responsibility”). Such assistance usually is due up to the point where those under threat are safe again. Thus, it seems inappropriate to only help countries in need of assistance with L&D up to the point it can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change and then leave them on their own. That would be likehelping someonedrowning to as far to the shore asonehas thrownhim in, but then swimaway.Rescuing someonedrowningmeans to tryone’sbest tobringhim safely to the shore irrespectiveof howmuchonecontributed to the threat.Because of this,webelieve thateven incases inwhichnoonecanbeascribedcompensatory responsibility, allof thoseafflictedbyclimateL&Dareentitled toassistance if they donothave thecapacity tomake themselveswholeagain.Thisespeciallyapplies to thosewho,due toclimateL&D, fall belowaspecified thresholdofharm. DistributiveJustice Especially tomeet this last challenge,wesuggest to alsoconsideringanalternative framingoftheethicalimplicationsofL&D,namelytheframingofdistributivejustice. According to this alternative framing, rather than regarding L&D as reasons for compensationonly,L&Dalsoprovides reasons for redistributiondue toundeserved harms. That is,wrongful emittingwould be relinquished as a relevant criterion to identify thedutybearers forpayments in caseofL&D. Instead, the focuswouldbe on thewrongfulnessofharmsasdefinedfromtheperspectiveofdistributive justice. In otherwords, the alternative framing to be considered demands redistribution in caseofunfairdisadvantagebutnot compensationdue towrongful emitting. Oneway todistinguishbetween redistribution and compensation startswith the premise that there is some baseline distribution of goods or bads that is just. This baselinedistribution is on theonehanddeterminedbycertain criteria or principles of justice (suchas thepriority view, the strict egalitarianviewor anyother) andon the other hand by legitimate changes to the distribution (as determined by criteria or principles of justice)which someone experiences as a result of her own respon- sible (and non-wrongful) choices. Deviations from this baseline then call for two different kinds of reactions. In case the reaction the deviation calls for isbased on thewrongfulnessofwhat occurred,we are operating in the realmof compensatory justice. Incase thereactionthedeviationcalls for isbasedonthe ideaofeveningout undeserved benefits or harms (which are due to bad luck, for example, or harmful 5Notablywehereunderstandclimatechangetoencompassbothanthropogenicclimatechangeand natural climatevariability.