Page - 157 - in Loss and Damage from Climate Change - Concepts, Methods and Policy Options

6 ThePoliticsof (andBehind) theUNFCCC’sLoss… 157 UNFCCCreliesonconsensus:disagreementaroundthevotingmajorityrequiredfor certaindecisionshasuntilnowpreventedtheadoptionoftherulesofprocedure(draft art.42).Thisimpliesthat,differentlyfromothermultilateralforawhereeachPartyis bestowedasinglevoteand thusgivenequalweight,finaloutcomes in theUNFCCC will likelymirrorParties’ capacity to shapeand influence thedecision-makingpro- cess. In this context, it is important to point out that, on their initiative, developing countriesmanaged to establish theWIM in2013 andobtain a dedicated article on L&D in the ParisAgreement in 2015.A leading role in the processwas assumed by theAllianceofSmall IslandStates (AOSIS), acoalitionof small islandand low- lyingcoastalcountriessharingsimilardevelopmentchallengesandvulnerabilities to climatechangeimpacts,andregardedamongthemostvocalgroups inclimate talks. Generally consideredas thepartieswith lessnegotiationpower, at least in termsof sheerdelegationsizes, theseachievements appearparticularly remarkable. ThecaseofAOSIShasbeencharacterisedasanexampleof theso-called“struc- turalist paradox” in negotiations (Betzold 2010), i.e., the case that weaker parties are often able to effectively negotiatewith stronger parties and get something out of the process (Zartman and Rubin 2002).More specifically, AOSIS’ capacity to influence theUNFCCChasbeenexplained in termsofmoral leadership(deÁgueda CorneloupandMol2014),capacityto“borrowpower”(Betzold2010),promotionof collaborativeapproaches toknowledgebuildingandcooperative institutionalmech- anisms (Larson2003).While importantly shedding light ona relativelyoverlooked topic, these contributions only explore limited timeframes1 and, bydesign, are not abletocaptureevolutionsanddiversificationsintheuseofpowersources.Moreover, none of them specifically addresses L&Dnegotiations, instead applying a broader adaptation lense. In this chapterwe specifically focus on the L&Dprocess over time in order to consideritsemergenceandevolutionfromthenegotiationoftheUNFCCC(1991)to theentryintoforceoftheParisAgreement(2016).Takingthe“structuralistparadox” inL&Dnegotiations as our starting point, we look beyond aggregatemeasures of power(likeGDP,populationsizeormilitaryforces)andconsiderdifferentsourcesof influencethatAOSISmighthaveactivatedtoshapeL&Doutcomes.WeanalyseL&D negotiations throughthelensesof themainschoolsof thought inIR—theneorealist, liberal and constructivist (Snyder 2004)—to better understand the complexities of finding international agreementonL&Dissues.Thisapproachmight lookunortho- dox, given that these schoolsof thought arebasedonhardly reconcilablepremises. Nevertheless, conceptual pluralism around the notion of power ismuch needed to understand how global outcomes are produced (Barnett andDuvall 2005), as dif- ferent formsof powermight capture different and interrelatedways throughwhich actors areenabledorconstrained inpursuing theirobjectives. 1Betzold(2010)focusesonAOSIS‘snegotiatingstrategies intheclimatechangeregimefrom1990 to1997;deÁguedaCorneloupandMol(2014)considertheperiod2007–2009;whileLarson(2003) analysesAOSIS’1994positionpaper:“DraftProtocoltotheUnitedNationsFrameworkConvention onClimateChangeonGreenhouseGasEmissionsReduction”.