Page - 184 - in Loss and Damage from Climate Change - Concepts, Methods and Policy Options

184 F.SimlingerandB.Mayer (see e.g.Al-Skeini v.UK).Thus, froma legal perspective, stateshavenoobligation to take into account the effects of their policies on the enjoyment of human rights outside their jurisdictionoreffectivecontrol. Tocomplywiththeirobligationtoprotectandfulfillhumanrights,statesmustalso takemeasuresnecessary toprevent human rights violationsbyprivate actors under theirjurisdiction.However, thisisagainlimitedtohumanrightsviolationswithinthe jurisdictionofthestate.Effortstopromoteresponsibilityofstatesforcompaniesthat commit human rights violations extra-territoriallyhave seen increased support. For instance, theCommissiononHumanRightsof thePhilippines,whichhas thepower toinvestigateallegedbarrierstotheenjoymentofhumanrights, investigateswhether carbonmajorsincausingclimatechangeandoceanacidificationviolatehumanrights. ThepetitionfiledbyGreenpeaceSoutheastAsiaandPhilippineRuralReconstruction Movement is based partly on the expert drafted, legally non-binding Maastricht PrinciplesonExtraterritorialObligationsofStates in theAreaofEconomic,Social andCulturalRights (ETOConsortium2013).The investigationwasstillongoingas of the timeofwriting. However, also cases invoking the failure of a state to address L&Dwithin its own jurisdiction appear extraordinarily unlikely to succeed before human rights institutions.Thepetitionerwouldfirstneedtoestablishthatgreenhousegasemissions of a particular state caused himor her to lose the enjoyment of a rightwithin that jurisdiction.Then,furtherevidencewouldneedtobeprovidedthat thecauseofsuch lossintheenjoymentofarightwasthefailureofthestatetotakeappropriatemeasures toprevent suchgreenhousegasemissions.Lastly, thepetitionerwouldhave torebut likelyargumentsbythestateaccordingtowhichtheprotectionofhumanrightscanbe limited in the pursuance of objectives of general interest such as economic growth or development. Before an international human rights body, the petitioner would need tomake the latter argument in amanner sufficiently compelling to persuade judgesorcommissionersthatthestate’sbalanceofhumanrightsprotectionwithsuch objectives of general interestwasnotwithin thenational “marginof appreciation,” so-calledbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights, intheprotectionofhumanrights. For instance, in 2005, the InuitCircumpolarConference submitted a petition to theInter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRightsagainst theUnitedStatesfortheir failure to prevent greenhouse gas emissions resulting in a violation of the human rightsof Inuit communities.Followingapublichearing, theCommissiondismissed thepetition (Chapman2010). However,casesaremorelikelytosucceedwheninvokingtheobligationofastate to protect the human rights of its population in isolation from its responsibility for climatechange.Anexampleof suchsuccessfulproceedingsbeforedomesticcourts wasmentioned inSect. 7.2 in thecaseofAshgarLeghari v.FederationofPakistan. Similar cases could be brought in in every circumstancewhere a state fails to take appropriate measures to protect its population against the adverse circumstances whichmayrelate to impactsofclimatechange.Yet, thisapproachdoesnotproperly provide for redress for the impacts of climate change as it relies on the state on whose territory a person is present for the protection of the human rights of this