Page - 196 - in Loss and Damage from Climate Change - Concepts, Methods and Policy Options

196 F.SimlingerandB.Mayer 2-yearworkplanwas followedbya“five-year rollingworkplan”adoptedatCOP22 (UNFCCC2016,Decision3/CP.22). TheinclusionofanarticleonL&DintheParisAgreementwasanotherambiguous concession to developing states. ThroughArticle 8, theParties of theParisAgree- ment “recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage…and the roleof sustainabledevelopment in reducing the riskof loss and damage” (ParisAgreement, art. 8(1)). It places theWIMunder the “authority and guidance” of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (Paris Agreement, art. 8(2)). It also highlights some areas of cooperation and facilitation such as on “early warning systems,” “emergency preparedness,” “slow onset events” and “events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage” (Paris Agreement, art. 8(4)). Yet, Article 8 does not imply any substantive international legal obligation beyond a vague statement that theParties“should enhanceunderstanding,actionandsupport…asappropriate,on a cooperative and facilitate basiswith respect to loss and damage associatedwith the adverse effects of climate change” (Paris Agreement, art. 8(3)). In that sense, Article 8of theParisAgreement does not really go further thanArticle 4(4) of the UNFrameworkConventiononClimateChange. Even such provision, however,was only inserted in the treaty after hard-fought negotiationsandwasaccompaniedbyacaveat.COP21,initsdecisionontheadoption of theParisAgreement, asserted that “Article 8of theAgreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation” (UNFCCC 2015, Decision 1/CP.21,para.51).ThelegalnatureofCOPdecisionshasbeendiscussedextensively byscholars (seee.g.MaceandVerheyen2016;Verheyen2005:67ff;Brunnée2002; Gehring2007;ChurchillandUlfstein2000:639).However,itonlystatestheobvious: nothing inArticle 8 could be taken to imply any liability or compensation, as the language isweakand theconcepts areundefined.Moreover, it goeswithout saying that this does not exclude the possible applicability of customary international law and possible arguments for state liability that stem from an alleged breach of the no-harmprinciple. Tenyears after the initiation of aworkstreamonL&D, fewconcrete steps have been taken. Instead, aworkprogramme led to a 2-yearworkplanwhich led to a 5- yearrollingworkplan.TheconceptofL&Dbecamemoreprominent ininternational negotiationsonclimatechangebutnoagreementwas reachedonhowto implement it.COP21decisionon theadoptionof theParisAgreement requested that theWIM establisha“clearinghouse for risk transfer”anda“task force…todevelop recom- mendations for integrated approaches to avert,minimize and address displacement relatedtotheadverseimpactsofclimatechange”(UNFCCC2015,decision1/CP.21, paras.48and49).ThesedevelopmentssuggestagrowingroleoftheWIMinsharing goodpracticesandissuingrecommendations,ratherthanprovidingcompensation.It maythusreplicatetheevolutionoftheconceptofadaptationininternationalnegotia- tionsonclimatechange,fromclaimsforremediesforthewrongscausedbyexcessive greenhousegas emissions in industrialised states, to a regimeof international over- sightonnationalmeasuressupportedonlyverypartiallybyinsufficient international financial support.