Page - 34 - in VULNERABLE - The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19

VULNERABLE34 such as closing or passing restrictions in relation to local businesses and municipal services (like playgrounds, libraries, and public tran- sit), declaring a local state of emergency, and imposing fines for those who do not adhere to public health restrictions. Although there is con- siderable interprovincial variation, the delivery of public health ser- vices often occurs at the local or regional level. Throughout the 1990s, most provinces shifted responsibility for the planning and delivery of health services, including public health, to regional entities. The purpose of this reform was to improve integration of health services. Although some provinces have recently moved away from regional governance and toward a single provincial health authority, public health services are sometimes still delivered on a regional basis. Under another model, municipalities appoint public health units, which are tasked with the delivery of public health services.6 The Constitution assigns the federal government several pow- ers that are relevant to public health, including quarantine and the criminal law. The latter has been interpreted broadly to include public health matters like drug regulation, tobacco control, and supervised consumption sites.7 The federal government also has the power to “make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada” (the POGG clause). According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the POGG clause is available in response to an emergency or a matter of “national concern,”8 which could include a pandemic. The federal Emergencies  Act sets out exceptional powers the government can exer- cise upon the declaration of an emergency.9 Indigenous-governmental relations are another important aspect of Canadian federalism,10 both in terms of which level of government 6. Raisa B Deber et al, “A Cautionary Tale of Downloading Public Health in Ontario: What Does it Say about the Need for National Standards for More than Doctors and Hospitals?” (2006) 2:3 Healthcare Policy 60. 7. In RJR  MacDonald  v  Canada  (Attorney  General), Justice LaForest stated that “[t]he scope of the federal power to create criminal legislation with respect to health mat- ters is broad, and is circumscribed only by the requirements that the legislation must contain a prohibition accompanied by a penal sanction and must be directed at a legitimate public health evil.” [1995] 3 SCR 199 at 246, 127 DLR (4th) 1. 8. Toronto  Electric  Com’rs  v  Snider  et  al, [1925] 2 DLR 5, 1 WWR 785 (PC); R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd, [1988] 1 SCR 401, 49 DLR (4th) 161. 9. Emergencies  Act, RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp). For a discussion of the POGG clause and federal emergencies legislation, see Colleen M Flood & Bryan Thomas, Chapter A-6 and Carissima Mathen, Chapter A-7 in this volume. 10. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Aimee Craft, Deborah McGregor & Jeffery Hewitt, Chapter A-2 of this volume. See also Robert Hamilton, “Indigenous Peoples and Interstitial Federalism in Canada” (2019) 24:1 Rev Const Stud 43.