Page - 42 - in VULNERABLE - The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19

VULNERABLE42 Committee for the duration of the pandemic. Facilitating communica- tion between these groups was a web-based system called the Canadian Network for Public Health Intelligence. In a sense, however, the les- sons of SARS were too well learned. The proliferation of bodies set up to support and coordinate government bodies itself led to delays in decision-making and a duplication of efforts; and the PHAC analysis following the H1N1 outbreaks called for greater clarity concerning the roles and responsibilities of all of the groups involved.31 Provincial and territorial jurisdictions also had serious orga- nizational issues. Most provinces had regional governance struc- tures in health care delivery, which made a centralized response to pandemic planning difficult. For example, Nova Scotia’s nine district health authorities were given the responsibility of manag- ing responses to potential pandemics, with the province becom- ing involved only when a district health authority (DHA) “could no longer adequately respond to the situation.”32 Yet there was no central review of district health authority plans, nor a clear sense of whether these plans existed at all. Further, information on the avail- able stockpiles of supplies held by DHAs was not readily available, and the province was uncertain whether they could “legally require the DHAs to provide details of their supplies on hand and costs for those supplies.”33 Similar supply-related coordination problems have arisen during COVID-19, including a dispute between Ottawa and Alberta over the approval of testing technology34 and problems with the distribution of personal protective equipment and testing supplies across the health sector. For example, while many hospitals were well stocked, long-term care homes often reported not having access to adequate supplies. 31. Public Health Agency of Canada and Health Canada, Lessons Learned Review: Public Health  Agency  of  Canada  and  Health  Canada  Response  to  the  2009  H1N1  Pandemic (Ottawa: Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010), online (pdf): Government  of  Canada <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/phac-aspc/migration/ phac-aspc/ about_apropos/evaluation/reports-rapports/2010-2011/h1n1/pdf/h1n1-eng.pdf>. 32. Nova Scotia Office of the Auditor General, Pandemic Preparedness (Halifax: Office of the Auditor General, 2010) at 12, online (pdf): Office  of  the  Auditor  General  <https:// oag-ns.ca/sites/default/files/publications/2009%20-%20Special%20Report %20-%20Pandemic%20Preparedness.pdf>. 33. Ibid at 20. 34. Ubaka Ogbogu & Lorian Hardcastle, “Crisis or Not, Alberta Must Not Do an End-Run Around Health Canada”, The  Globe  and  Mail (20 April 2020), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-crisis-or-not-alberta-must- not-do-an-end-run-around-health-canada/>.